The Man Who Knew Too Much

Espionage in Reality and Fiction: Regional Ontology and Iconicity

“The very fantasy of a spy’s life, the loss of his own identity, his pursuit of pseudo-information through pseudo-relations, makes him a sort of hero of our time.” Malcolm Muggeridge

Schmitt and Smith

A basic form of iconicity in literature is the correspondance between basic conceptual schemata in literary semantics on the one hand and in factual treatments on the other – corresponding to the type 4) iconicity in the previous chapter. Thus, the semantics of a subject like espionage is not subject to arbitrary variation in literature, but is rather highly dependent on the regional ontology involving such phenomena.

Political science and historiography contain an enormous amount of concrete studies of famous espionage cases and agent operations, concerning the activities of both domestic and foreign services. Similarly, cases of this kind have caught public imagination to a huge extent with a whole literary genre - that of the spy and the agent novel - as a literary result. Just like its cognate the detective genre rises with Poe and Rue Morgue, the spy novel is born, albeit more gradually, with Kipling, Conrad, Ambler, Greene, Somerset Maugham, etc., to grow into one of the 20. century’s stable and comprehensive literary subgenres.

It is a strange fact, however, that despite its firm grip around the imagination of the 20. century, both in fact and fiction, espionage does not seem to have given rise to any significant amount of proper scientific treatment. No classic piece of writing betitled “Vom Geheimdienste” by any Clausewitz exists in political science. Despite the constant and delicate tension between the existence of secret services, necessary for the security of
a democratic society, on the one hand, and the same democracy’s basic principles about open administration, human rights, and equality, on the other, no tradition for deeper, theoretical understanding of this necessity and these tensions seems to exist. It is almost as if the natural secrecy of the subject is mirrored by a secrecy covering the principal reflection on it - whereas on the other hand both the factual and the fictitious coverings of single, concrete cases explode. The latter seems, in fact, to constitute a huge corpus of case-based reasoning governing the public - and maybe also the services’ own - reasonings about the tasks, the constraints, and and regulations of the services.

I shall here attempt to outline the ontology of espionage, as a basis for the factual as well as the fictitious cases and for the possibility of iconicity holding between them. The clever reader will be quick to intervene: do I not confuse two separate problems? Is the description of the espionage novel not a piece of narratology dealing with genre literature - a task for literary studies - while the recurring structures of the object itself, espionage, is rather a task for political science and sociology? It is of course not possible to assume beforehand that these two tasks will be identical, but still it seems to me that a strong argumentation is at hand for the fact that they are intimately related. Not only because of the fact that all reflection of a subject marked “secret” must keep on the distance of abduction from it, relying to some indefinite extent on the imagination and fantasies of the interpreter. But also because the relation between semantics and ontology for actual semiotics, as argued in this book, is rather different from what was assumed in the tradition running from structuralism to deconstruction and other post-structuralisms denying the possibility of iconicity in language and literature. The question of literary mimesis pertains, as we saw in the previous chapter, to several different levels: one is the possible similarity between aspects of textual expression and the subject treated (the figure poem as an example); another is the possible depicting value of a text in relation to certain empirical properties of reality (be they factual, as in journalism or science, be they more general like in the discussion of the possibility of literary realism to reveal insights about a given period, society or other issues). The iconicity at stake in the discussion in the following lies at an even more basic level: iconicity at the level of semantic structures used. I shall argue that the spy novel provides an example of this basic iconicity in so far as the very construction and understanding of a spy novel is only possible by the use of ontologically motivated concept structures similar to those incarnated in real life espionage cases.
We have already discussed Barry Smith’s “fallibilistic apriorism” extending the philosophical a priori realm to a long range of conceptual structures in the foundations of the single empirical sciences (ch. 8). An implication of this idea is that a priori structures cover a far wider field than normally assumed; there is no reason to believe that formal ontology, common to all possible objects, is yet complete, and there is similarly no reason to assume that the single sciences’ material or regional ontologies may not be investigated much more thoroughly than has been the case. The basis of each single science will contain, in its basic conceptual structures, a comprehensive network of interrelated terms of formal and regional ontology. It follows from this idea that works of fiction sharing the same subject as one of these sciences, will also share, to a considerable extent, one and the same basic conceptual structure.\textsuperscript{ii} Thus, Smith’s approach entails that the semantics describing the content of a given domain will have iconic affinity to the ontology of the domain (even if many specific differences may of course prevail in the single case). This is the implication of one of Smith’s slogans: “putting the world back into semantics”. \textsuperscript{iii} So, we take the spy novel as an example of the fourth Ingardenian iconicity type – to conclude with the issue of how this type may indirectly activate iconicitities of the fifth type, that of metaphysical qualities.

If we begin, naively, by taking a dictionary definition of a central concept for the agent novel like the term “spy”, we will find he is a person who “illegally investigates (especially military) secrets”. \textsuperscript{iv} This definition refers to a whole range of implicite presuppositions belonging to an espionage script, an underlying highly structured diagrammatic scenario. Deprived of references to that scenario, the semantics of the word “spy” would be ineffable. A spy investigates some subject secretly because of a certain danger or illegality in the investigation which, in turn, is determined by the fact that its subject is the business of some competing power, political or private, domestic or foreign. There is thus an a priori connection between the secrecy of the information and the relative illegality in which the spy indulges. The parenthesis of the dictionary definition implies that the spy typically has been sent out as an instrument to gather information by one power, militarily competing with another power possessing the secrets. Thus it is only in the light of this a priori, more general and more comprehensive, ongoing struggle that espionage becomes meaningful. The spy is, in essence, dependent on that schematic whole. Any fight sufficiently elaborated in time and space will always imply that knowledge about the opponent’s next move adds to the probability for a positive outcome: this implies it is possible to
try to anticipate that move and improve the efficiency of one’s own next move. Or one may simulate such a move in order to seduce the opponent to open a flank giving a possibility for an even more efficient move. The agonistic structure of feints, simulated feints, etc. is implied here, as it is well known from mathematical game theory and instantiated in a long series of other fight or game types. The historiography of warfare is to a large extent based on the investigation of such structures of mutual deception strategies. The raison d’être of the spy as collector of information lies in this scenario or script of struggle, and his role is to be a tool for one of the agonists of the battle waged.

Here we have isolated a minimal version of the regional ontology of espionage by looking at background presuppositions to a dictionary definition of the word “spy”. A more systematic investigation might go the opposite way and try to develop the concepts of war, fight, game, or battle in order to distill espionage as one of the possible moments of fighting. A project of this kind is to be found in A.J. Greimas’s narratology. Despite its apparent simplicity, this narratology remains one of the most sophisticated instruments to analyse narrative structures. At a first glance, the “narrative schema” of this theory is deceptively simple: a Destinator, defined as an actant impersonating central values, sends out an Operator Subject in order to solve a certain task. This subject is endowed with certain competences by a Helper during a first “qualifying” trial; then follows the “principal” trial where the Subject tries to defeat an Anti-Subject in order to take some Object in his possession. Back at the Destinator’s, the Subject presents his results in a third and last, “glorifying” trial and he receives - if the result is convincing - a Sanction judging the Subject’s efforts. If the Subject wins this trial, he may receive a final Object as a reward or trophy. These three trials may, in specific cases, be realised in highly different ways, ranging from regular wars and to peaceful exchanges. A version of it clothed in fairy-tale garments makes the schema more intuitive: a King is threatened by a Dragon who has abducted the Princess, and he sends out a Hero to make up for it. The Hero must first gain a magical object or competence from some Sorcerer and he may now kill the Dragon and free the Princess. Back at the Court, the Hero displays the saved Princess and receives a reward, maybe the Princess and half of the Kingdom. If this diagram of imagination is so apparently simple, then it is probably due to its omnipresence in human imagination rather than to an inherent simplicity, not to talk about triviality. The schema contains a complexity generator due to the fact that every single phase of it refers to intersubjective relations with all the possible mirroring,
dialectics of recognition and possible misunderstandings involved. This has as a consequence that the schema may “develop” in a huge bundle of different directions. The interaction between two actants which is in one version a raging battle may in other versions be a completely peaceful exchange - and, what is more, in each phase the teleological development mapped by the schema may go wrong. Maybe the Hero is too afraid to go to war; maybe the Sorcerer refuses to let go of his medicine copyright; maybe the Dragon actively tries to get rid of the awful Princess; maybe the King stubbornly sticks to both halves of his Kingdom; maybe there is a secret alliance between Dragon and King in order to fool the public, etc., etc., and etc. As is evident, the schema is extremely plastic with respect to variations - at the same time as it has the stable character of being a prototype for the charting of socially integrable actions in general. As an addition to this powerful variability, the staging of narrative events in more or less artful enunciation may select single phases of the schema to emphasize and elaborate, while other phases are neglected. It may, moreover, display the events narrated, as seen from changing points-of-views of different actants, and, finally, it may recursively repeat the realization of it in different versions including the substitution of characters filling the actant roles and the embedding of local versions of the schema into more encompassing versions.

But the very question of social integration implied in the relation between Destinator – norm representative - and Subject – norm breaker - guides us on our way to the status of the spy in this schema. Of course, espionage may occur in each of the phases in the schema - in so far as the secret obtaining of secret information may be desirable in all intersubjective relationships. But because the Destinator incarnates socially stable values, the character of the Hero’s task is decisive for the interest taken in the narrative in question. If the Hero’s task follows ordinary procedures as governed by central administration, little remains to be told (“Once upon a time, there was King who should send a document to the council in one of his towns. He gave the task to one of his very best couriers, and the document did in fact reach its goal regularly. The courier received his contractual wage and lived happily ever after.”). A procedure of this kind is of course covered by the narrative schema’s domain of modelisation, but for a narrative to be interesting it is well known that it must contain some moment or other of norm break. This is, in fact, already implied in the very distinction between Destinator and Operator Subject: the frictionless action might as well be undertaken by the Destinator himself (if the Destinator in case is, e.g., central administration). The King might himself grab his good
sword all at once and force it through the heart of the dragon. But he must have another actant do it, even one who receives occult, extraordinary, illegal abilities from some Sorcerer, that is, a person incarnating a competence transgressing what is usual and lawbound and hence having powers and possibilities exceeding those of the King. The killing of the Dragon, moreover, most often takes place far from home - that is, far from the regular domain of laws and outside of public control. In this extraordinary competence in the Hero lies as a germ espionage, and more broadly, the secret agent, as an aspect of the Hero’s deed. The Hero constitutes his own Special Task Force, and his deed is in itself to some extent a Covert Action. Now these features in the Hero actant do not distinguish the spy as opposed to e.g. the warrior, the detective and similar stereotypes derived from the same basic structure in the Hero.

Consequently, further differentia specifica must be found in order to grasp the difference between spy, detective, soldier, and the correlated fiction genres. We may as a first preliminary emphasize that the three of them share the Hero’s character of being exceptional. The detective novel does not have the regularly working police officer as its hero, the war novel does not have the average, ordinary soldier as its hero. The detective novel favors precisely the private eye, and even more so, the deviant private eye who does not do his work “by the book” but differs from the police in two respects: he does not, like they do, act correctly according to the rules, and, conversely, he is not involved in their muddle of corruption and mafia deals resulting from their rule breaks. Exactly because he does not act “by the book” he may, paradoxically, act by the spirit and do the right thing. Even if we do, in fact, focus upon a regular police officer in the corps, we most often chose a deviant cop whose personal character and working methods transgress the average (model Colombo). Analogously, the modern war novel generally takes the point of view of a rebellious private, despising his superordinates at a comfortable distance to the front line, not obeying nor respecting their orders. Thus, this “front pig”, being an uncompromising survivor, may perform especially dangerous services. What distinguishes the spy - and the spy novel - from these stereotypes is that while the private eye and the front pig form individual cases of deviancy in the service of a higher cause (which they may serve so much more efficiently because of their disregard for rules), the spy’s deviancy, on the contrary, is systematical. The very service for which he is working constitutes an anomaly in modern society. The secret service is so to speak an institutionalized deviancy inside the state, a whole state organization characterized by not being forced
to do things “by the book”. As contemporary conflict researchers (like in Scandinavia Ole Wæver and Ola Tunander) have emphasized, we must turn to obscure political thinkers like Carl Schmitt in order to understand the specific character of these organizations. Schmitt began his classic of philosophy of state *Politische Theologie* from 1922 with the famous words: “Sovereign is he who determines the state of emergency ...”. In the context of Greimasian fairy tale logic, it is the Destinator who commands the state of emergency. Ordinary law is only valid in so far a state of emergency is not declared - and the actant who decides whether the normal state prevails is of course endowed with the power of suspending it, to some (larger or lesser) degree depending on his own judgment only. Schmitt’s cynical tradition turns Clausewitz upside down: the universalization of the schema of Friend and Foe makes politics a war continued with other means. In such a tradition it will be a corollary that a preparedness or capacity outside ordinary legality must be kept, also during (apparent) peacetime. The state of emergency is always potentially present, and for this reason an organization is needed which is continuously able to judge which extralegal means are necessary to cope with occurring threats against the security of state. Schmitt is, for this reason, the Cold War’s theoretician *avant la lettre*: any peace is according to him nothing but a cold war. In the Greimasian narrative schema the agent and the spy thus belong to a scenario in which the Destinator as a sovereign partially stops doing things by the book - and turns, instead, to the Schmittian book.

*The Man Who Knew Too Much - the positional character of the spy*

This implies a series of distinguishing features in the spy as a potential aspect of the Hero - in contradistinction to the detective and soldier characters. In the most comprehensive and detailed text analysis which Greimas undertook - the booklength Maupassant analysis *Maupassant*, the short story “Deux Amis” analyzed has as its main theme precisely: espionage. During the Prussians’ siege of Paris in 1871, two Parisian friends go fishing, and they receive a paper passport in order to cross the French lines into no-man’s-land (which is a peaceful zone, there is still 40 years to World War I). After fishing, they are picked up by a Prussian patrouille who demand that they reveal the password they are supposed to possess in order to pass the French lines. They are unable to do so, of course, as the do not possess any password, and they are summarily executed. Greimas’ detailed analysis finds that this killing represents the cruelty of power (especially
Prussian power) as opposed to heroic citizens keeping a secret. The Danish semiotician Per Aage Brandt has, at this point, caught Greimas in a misinterpretation with crucial implications for the status of the spy. The two Parisians do not possess the password which the Prussians believe (they only have a paper passport), and they are unable to say what they do not know: they do not keep silent for heroic reasons. Correspondingly, the Prussian officer is not personally cruel, he just acts conforming to an ordinary logic of warfare.\textsuperscript{xi} The two of them have, in fact, seen the position of the German lines, and if they are allowed to get back behind the French lines, no Prussian may prevent them from informing the French defense. Even if the two fishermen are by no means spys, neither intentionally nor institutionally, they invariably become spys, functionally, because they are who they are where they are.\textsuperscript{xii} If you take a walk on a secret military area with your camera - we may recall certain Danish tourists arrested in Poland in the mid-eighties - then you are a spy, no matter whether the reason you do so may in fact be your innocent interest in a rare bird. In this light, the Prussian is not cruel, he just acts according to the \textit{jus necessitatis} of warfare - exactly the same principle according to which secret services act during the cold war of peace. A classic of this species constitutes the Profumo affair, in which the British secretary of defense was forced to quit because he kept the same mistress, Christine Keeler - whether she took herself paid for her services or not - as a Russian intelligence officer, Jevgenij Ivanov. It is improbable that Keeler did in fact hand over sensitive information to the latter, but the simple fact of her position in the scenario was sufficient to release the scandal.\textsuperscript{xiii}

This is of course the reason why it may be very important for the state to keep a file on persons with access to classified material. If they - who positionally are potential spys - should also decide to become spys \textit{in actu}, then they must be made silent. They may be forced, for instance, to go out in the press and discredit themselves, maybe declare themselves insane, so all their sayings become polluted with ambiguity - and then they are maybe rewarded, in secret, with a pension that they would not have received under other circumstances. The specific methods of pressure are many, but the structure is stable - it is, as we know from a classic of the spy genre: it is impossible definitely to come in from the cold when you have first been out there. When first you have been a spy, then you continue being it, positionally, no matter what you may personally decide, because you now have the unavoidable property of knowing too much. This logic of position implies that the spy forms a radical example of impossibility of social
reintegration. It is a well-known fact in fairy-tales that when the victorious Hero returns home with a Dragon’s ear in one arm and a Princess in the other, a narrative problem may arise. Why should he be satisfied with a Kingdom and half of the Princess or whatever the King is prepared to offer - he, the Dragon slayer, who achieved what the King himself could not? Why shouldn’t he take it all? The military coup as a structural possibility is inherent in this argument, just like revolutions, stabs-in-the-back and so on, and during peacetime the same logic seems to underlie the notoriously difficult reintegration of veterans after great wars. The extreme level of excitement and fear, the fact that every moment and every action concern life and death, the ultimate dependency upon the small Männerbund at the front and its unconditional friendship - all these experiences may make an ordinary civil life in peacetime seem like a dull superficial existence. It has often been remarked that the rocker organisations Hell’s Angels and Bandidos were founded by American veterans from World War II and the Vietnam War, respectively, and the same goes for Nazism’s triumph in the twenties and thirties which was only possible due to the support from enormous self-organized bands of First World War veterans in the SA and related Freikorps. Serbia in our time, marred by enormous mafia structures embedded in the state and led by former paramilitary troops from the wars in the 90s, forms an actual example of how difficult it may be to prevent the influence of such types on the state when first they are around. The reintegration of the veterans is a psychological (and in large number cases a sociological or political) problem which may be contained by different means - the reintegration of the spy an individual problem (and of course no large scale social problem), but then again so much more impossible. The spy may sing until he is dead, and hence he must be bound with pensions, threats, blackmail etc., because he can not leave the position of knowledge he now occupies. This structure is what, conversely, makes it possible for a spy to blackmail or punish his former organization if it does not treat him as expected. The British spy Leslie Nicholson was stationed in Prague in 1930 and spent 20 years there in the service of the SIS. When his wife became ill, he asked C, Sir Stewart Menzies (the “M” of Fleming’s Bond novels) for a loan which was refused. After his wife’s death, Nicholson emigrated to the USA and took revenge on the SIS by publishing his British Agent there in 1964. Peter Wright’s Spycatcher from 1987 is a related example.

Two service types
The stable security structure of post-war 20. century in most countries features two organizations, foreign and domestic, and with connections to the military and the police, respectively. This structure has ancient roots (even if there was a tendency until the Second World War that services were founded *ad hoc* and cancelled in periods of peace³⁶) and gives rise to a stable set of differences. Codes of honour based on mutual recognition is considered a military virtue and tend to have a certain influence on the former services, while the latter in its tendency mirrors the radicality of civil war as opposed to international warfare. Police-based services have as their object the state’s own citizens (or domestic foreigners) conspiring against the security of the very state in which they live. Thus, they are aimed agains traitors who are not seen as objects for the soldier’s (potential, that is) gentleman-like behaviour towards other soldiers only accidentally serving foreign powers, maybe being forced to do so by conscription. The French historian of religion Georges Dumézil once made an interesting observation in this respect when he discussed the relation of freedom to the second function (the military function) of Indo-European religion and ideology³⁷.

I translate the relevant passage from an interview:

Jacques-Alain Miller: “Generally, as you analyze it, the second function displays a paradoxical aspect, because it effects the socialization of rather asocial features.”

Georges Dumézil: “It is dangerous, but exactly for the reason that it does not respect laws, it may also happen that it may give rise to happy exceptions in those procedures where *summum jus summa injuria*.”

[cf. later in the interview: GD: “The warrior is a creature who in all cases, not only sexuality, is always on the limit between the legal and the illegal, the ordinary and the exceptional.”]

JAM: “Thus you write that “the warrior keeps the features which takes him away from ordinary people and even puts him in an opposition to the social order which he has as his task to protect when necessary.””

GD: “Ths possibility for opposition to the social order may appear for better and for worse. Deep down, it corresponds to the opposition between army and police. During the German occupation it was the opposition between Wehrmacht and Gestapo. It was much better to be involved with the former than with the latter. How could I forget the
Mauss incident? He was saved because his flat had been claimed by the army ...”
JAM: “But doesn’t the army represent the military function here?”
GD: “Yes. The army needed his apartment and its terrace at eighth floor, close to Porte d’Orléans, for anti-aircraft defense. One morning, I was at Mauss’s place when a colonel, in a brusque but friendly manner, made him understand that the respite which he had been given had run out. Mauss negotiated and eventually got a new respite. Thanks to this, his library could be transported to the Musée de l’Homme and he himself could move into another place fifty meters from home in a flat required by the army.”
Jean-Claude Milner: “That is Mars Tranquillus?”
GD: “Let us say that is military honour.”
JCM: “And the Gestapo?”
GD: “They represented, unfortunately, the first function. Police has to do with the first function. The RigVeda calls the stars “spys” for the sovereign god Varuna.”
Alain Grosrichard: “That implies that deep down the descendants of the Germans still used trifunctionality during the war?”
GD: “Let us not go that far. Let us just say that by coincidence, Gestapo’s and the Party’s relation to the army now and then mirrored the mythical depth of the relation between Varuna and Indra.”
JCM: “You have written by several occasions that German culture has underlined two aspects of the second function: its violent side, the military gang, the Männerbund, as well as its autonomous side, freedom. But when I read you I have in the back of my head texts by 19 Century historians claiming that the individual liberty was born in the forests of Germania. Is it possible, according to you, to find a sort of matrix in German law rather than Roman law, tied to the second function, which might serve as the structure of some sort of freedom?”
GD: “A priori, it does not seem improbable. Let us think of the thing, the English and Scandinavian parliaments.”

Apart from the fact that the right-wing royalist Dumézil here appropriates a Scandinavian-German myth about the origins of freedom which must have been felt like an insult on the Left Bank, the distinction made is interesting. The warrior makes possible freedom, honour, mutual recognition and has his place on the limit between law and transgression; the high priest and judge - and their spies - of the first function seem highly elevated over that very
limit. The spy and the police are connected to the somber first function which, unlike the second, has nothing to do with freedom, autonomy, and honour. We glimpse the ravens of the first function sovereign deity Odin, these scouting scavengers, as an achetype of the spy - and the crafty Odin versus the brave Thor as an adequate Nordic icon of the Indian Varuna/Indra distinction. According to this distinction, the first function’s police is thus potentially less concerned about rules and rights and hence less “democratic” than is the second function’s army\textsuperscript{xix} - and so the intelligence services of the two organizations, although both tend towards the first function side of the distinction so that army intelligence rather forms a sort of intermediate compromise between the constraints of the two functions. The first function, however, is superordinate to the second, it is precisely sovereign, also in a Schmittian sense of the word, because it is a task of the first function to determine whether ordinary law prevails. Prisoners of war are respected due to conventions and are returned to the enemy after the war; foreign spys are relegated, while the country’s own undermining forces are classified as traitors and even criminals of an especially malignant type - this indicates that Dumézil’s distinction remains to some extent valid in our days foreign and domestic services and their different treatment of their opponents.

The foreign services meet as their opponents organisations, similarly organised and equipped, from enemy or neutral (or even friendly) states. This implies a mirror structure we recognize from many spy novels, and it entails defection as a constant possibility. For the double, triple or nth level agent it is a possible way out when the earth is burning beneath him and the threat of exposure comes close; for the agent in general a way out, also to escape from other possible, maybe personal problems. The capital you may use to buy defection is, of course, inside knowledge which will subsequently be paid off in long-stretched debriefing sessions. The defector will now find himself at the mercy of the receiver country and an obvious possibility is the emergence of a new relation of mistrust given by the fact that the defector’s interest is to feint more knowledge than he actually has and to delay the disclosure of it until he has gained maximal advantages from it. Domestic services most clearly representing Dumézil’s first function are only part of this mirroring by their involvement in counter-espionage, while its other measures taken against the state’s own citizens rarely face a similarly organized resistance. In return, the interior service in many modern states is likely to suffer from a structural paranoia due to its status as subject to a controlling Destinator in the form of public, parliamentary control\textsuperscript{xx}. It may
seem natural for this service to act as an autonomous instance - also in a stronger sense than indicated by the natural Weberian tendency of all bureaucracies towards secrecy. Thus, it may seem a matter of course for it to extend its interests also to powers or persons which may not be a threat to security of the state but are merely threats to the service’s interests, that is, politicians or writers with critical or even merely controlling intentions related to the services. A continuum thus stretches from security of state and to security of the service, and it is hard to exclude the possibility that a service may in case of crisis chose the latter rather than the former. The military coup is, by a homologous structure, the foreign service’s corresponding possibility; the domestic service’s possible unfaithfulness is bound to follow less conspicuous ways - for an unverified example, take the recurring rumours about right wing circles in the Stockholm secret police SÄPO and their support to the Palme assassination. According to Seymour Hersh’s recent book on Kennedy’s presidential period, J. Edgar Hoover was able to guarantee his continued leadership of the FBI under the newly elected president (who disliked him) by maintaining huge dossiers involving sensitive information on Kennedy, including his first and blacked-out marriage in the forties.

Generally, democratic control with such organizations is by nature a delicate issue. Control commissions must keep silent, even regarding the controllers’ own political parties, and on the other hand, how can a commission make sure it has received access to all relevant information from the services? This tension has a principal a priori character, in so far as total public control with such organizations would severely limit or even reduce their possibility of action - it is a given thing that such organizations must, for the sake of efficiency, be given a certain margin in which to operate, both as regards secrecy and as regards violation of law for the sake of security - even if this fact makes the organizations constantly vulnerable to potential public scandals. The old saying, attributed to Lenin: trust is good; control is better, cannot be applied here. The problem about control of the controller leads, of course, to an infinite regress which is only doubled by the necessary secrecy in the control of secrecies. Control must, sooner or later, at some delicate level, meet a limit, beyond which only trust remains.

Two insecurities
A further a priori necessity in the spy and agent characters is the particular recruitment circumstances. No matter how upright, well-educated, and clear-minded the leading figures in an intelligence organization are - and they must be, if any - they are in no position to impose the same requirements on all their subordinates. To undertake the dirty work, they will have to use occurring characters of different kinds. The Greimas asymmetry between Destinator and Hero thus multiplies internally within the organization: the director of secret actions must make use of concrete tools operating in that part of reality which must be kept under surveillance, influenced and manipulated - and for secrecy reasons it is obvious that you can not arbitrarily plant anybody anywhere. You must, to a large extent, use persons who by coincidence have a character, a past, or a position making it possible for them to fit unseen into the environment in question. And this implies that you cannot afford to be too fastidious: this is not tasks which it is possible to educate people to fulfil, except for - exactly - exceptional cases. This does not imply unfaithfulness as a necessity but as an always threatening limit possibility: this personnel outside of perfect control consists to some extent of misfits, persons of a peculiar psychology, persons who for odd reasons feel attracted to intelligence work, people easy to convince to betray their employers, ideological fanatics, people who feel drawn by sinister affairs, people who undertake such duties of bitter necessity, people who are easy to threaten to do such tasks - even if you may ever so much hope that their main motivation be idealist. As in so many aspects of intersubjectivity, these actors’ motivations are hard to determine: idealism, loyalty, excitement, desire for recognition, money, threats, brute force ... the manifold of possible motivations implies that the superordinate person will have a tendency to make sure that he, just in case, has access to the latter means of influence. This insecurity implies that an elementary relation of mistrust inside the organization is obvious - which is proved by the many cases of important information that was not taken seriously. Dusan Popov informed the American army about the Japanese Pearl Harbor plan but he was not believed; the Soviet Western intelligence was well-informed about Operation Barbarossa, but they were in no position to convince Stalin ... this insecurity spreads like a fog in the relation between the intelligence organization and its own informants and henchmen on all levels. An obvious danger in this fuzzy subworld is that the organization believes what it wants to believe, and it must face the paradox that the more information a message contains - that is, the more surprising it is - the less probable is it that the message will be believed.
This top-down insecurity is doubled, however, by a parallel and even more decisive bottom-up insecurity. For security reasons, the single agent must of course know as little as possible about the general plan of which he forms a part - not to speak about other parallel operations - but this necessary “compartmentalization” of information and tasks implies a fundamental insecurity about the very character of the operation as seen from below. Not only is the individual, like in all struggles, at a feint’s distance from the enemy and his intentions; this basic indecidability is doubled, for the spy’s point of view, by a parallel insecurity as to the exact intentions of his own side. This structure has its most prominent result the heavy weapon of counter-espionage, the double agent, who acts as if he belongs to one side while employed by the other (probably, maybe his sympathies are changing ...). You will never know, as a spy, if your spymaster or leading officer is miserly with information because his deepest sympathy lies elsewhere - cf. the classic uncoverings of the third, fourth, fifth man of the Cambridge Five, all of whose existence was known long before a name could be singled out. This structure entails that a fundamental insecurity spreads in the whole spy world, pinpointed in Len Deighton’s description of how Bernard Samson’s own wife Fiona all of a sudden disappears as the enemy’s most treasured double agent. This insecurity has several sources (apart from the enemy’s natural attempts at spreading fog): the insecurity whether the mission you are on has a real purpose or if it is rather a deception operation destined to fool the enemy while the really important operation takes place elsewhere; the insecurity whether the mission you are on is in fact planned by double agents in your own organization; the insecurity whether your own organization does in fact attempt to satisfy the goals it presumes and not completely other purposes.

In extreme cases an agent may, as a “useful idiot”, function as a tool for an organization without even knowing it himself. And such matters may not even be settled by archive files - because a spymaster has his own interests, in turn, in relation to his superordinates on a higher level. A well-equipped archive with files on alleged “agents” and “spys” may keep him safe, even if the persons mentioned are to a large extent not at all spys but only innocent people to whom he maintains loose contacts.

In the secret organisation, this very secrecy principle has an ambiguous character which adds to the spreading of fog. The basic motivation for secrecy is naturally immanently given: the enemy must not know what we know. But to this, a procedural secrecy is quickly added: the enemy must not know the illegal procedures undertaken in order to gain
information etc. - this becomes in itself a potential conflict cause. And this problem doubles once more internally in democratic societies: the public must not know (too much) about the types of method used because this may delegitimate democracy’s own laws and ideals. These constraints have led to a violent growth in the use of the three classic grades of secrecy: confidential, secret, and top secret. In the American context, this has recently been investigated by senator Moynihan (1998) finding that the extent of secrecy is now so all-encompassing that it forms a threat to the very efficacy of the services, and, in the last resort, to the security of state.

Secrecy is naturally a basic problem in an open society, but in addition to that comes the fact that secrecy may blind the intelligence organizations for important real-world facts. Moynihan predicted the fall of the Soviet Union as early as in the late seventies, and he wonders why the CIA did not have the slightest idea of what was to come, even immediately before the breakdown - in spite of the obvious crisis in Soviet economy and the international decline of Marxism as an ideology. xxv Too much secrecy not only entails that the organization may lose grasp of its own informations; it may, furthermore, lead to the widespread misunderstanding that just because something is marked Top Secret it is *eo ipso* true. But even worse, Moynihan argues: the enormous increase in secrecy has given the American services a reputation as state monsters turned against the population, and a frightening statistics proves that around three fourths of the American population believe in conspiracy theories involving the services, among them the Kennedy and Martin Luther King assassinations, the lore about the secret military shootdown of ufos and autopsy of extraterrestials at Roswell in the fifties - and much more. The extent of secrecy thus may threaten to destabilize the very relation between state and population - and Moynihan proposes a radical intervention. Obligatory discharge of secrecy marked material after 10 years (of course with the possibility of withholding especially sensitive cases). In all cases, his diagnosis is thought-provoking: the very act of secrecy may contribute to inefficiency as well as to discrediting of the organization using it.

It is thus a part of the nature of espionage that a potential insecurity with several structural sources spreads at many levels. This should not, of course, hide the fact that most of the everyday work in such an organization is probably completely undramatic and is concerned with information taken from official or other public sources. Very often 75 % is mentioned as an estimate of the part of the organizations’ work which remains completely untouched by such insecurities. But even if the insecurities do not have to be
part of one and every operation, they are constantly present as a potential limit condition. Moreover, they are most often involved in sufficiently complicated, spectacular, and embarrassing cases which is why they play a main role in the spy literature - cf. Muggeridge the spy’s quote at the beginning of this chapter.

Literature and agents

These fundamental insecurities distinguish the spy from the detective and the front pig. The detective may be ever so insecure about who and what may be trusted in the world of crime and police, but his own common sense is unshaken, even if he is disillusioned about everything else; his own mission, be it with or without success, is basically out of the reach of doubt. The front pig may be ever so let down and deserted by superordinates and under attack from enemies, left behind in the most meaningless and disillusioned battle on Earth - but his own and his front pals’ fundamental fight for survival provides a firm ground of reality not to be shaken. Before we go on to investigate the spy novel’s relation to these a priori structures in the ontology of espionage, it is worth mentioning that exactly the insecurities mentioned give writings about espionage a rather particular relation to categories like fact and fiction. Even the memoir writing by indubitable spies is ripe with paragraphs to which they themselves are the only possible or only actual sources. This implies that they may potentially take themselves all possible freedoms when describing the events in question, just like they may owe different persons and organizations to cut things out or color the narration in various ways. The insecurity moment in the very object thus implies that a potential fictivity sticks to even the most well documented spy accounts. It is very few other factual domains which could give rise to volumes like the *Faber Book of Espionage* which as matter of course mixes up excerpts from spy novels with dito memoirs. Ian Fleming side by side with Kim Philby, Graham Greene with George Blake, Somerset Maugham with “Dusko” Popov. This intricate relation between espionage and literature is also emphasized by the fact that very many top agent novel authors possess a first hand knowledge about the business. This includes Fleming, le Carré, Somerset Maugham, Greene - who even worked together with Philby - which is why their works of fiction might be suspected (and are in fact so suspected!) for, to larger or lesser extents, to be key novels. Is James Bond a fiction copy of Popov (minus his hump), is Leslie Nicholson the model for Greenes *Nobody to Blame*, etc. ...?). In the
same vein, anecdotes flourish about the really existing organizations having lent inspirations from spy novels or their authors, cf. the idea that Fleming should be the source of CIA’s plans of killing Fidel Castro by a cigar explosion or infecting him with barber’s itch so he would lose his charismatic beard and, with it, political power. Thus, there is a fluid borderline between fact and fiction because of the fact that fiction is a core part of the ontology of espionage. This does not imply that a unanimous reality of espionage does not exist - it just entails that we have no methodologically granted access to that reality. Thus, there is a structural connection between literature and espionage. The author shares central features with the spy in so far he is a (partly) disinterested observer on the margin of the society in which he lives - but in addition to this structural analogy, there seems to be an empirically well-founded correlation between writers and intellectuals on the one hand and spys on the other. Already the playwright Christopher Marlowe performed counter-espionage for Queen Elizabeth I and her chief of intelligence Walsington against Mary Queen of Scots and paid with his life for it. Geoffrey Chaucer is believed to have spied for John of Gaunt, and the famous French 18. Century spy, the Knight of d’Eon (often disguised as Miss Lia of Bermont) was also the author of a treatise on economics. The first intelligence service in England around the Duke of Marlborough involved Daniel Defoe who later became the first leader of organized intelligence in England and thus, in a certain sense, one of the founders of Secret Service. In addition to many deeds as active spy, e.g. against the Scots, he even wrote one of the first papers on intelligence “A Scheme for General Intelligence” (1704). “Intelligence is the soul of public business,” so Defoe, who continues to define counter-espionage: “For as intelligence is the most useful to us, so keeping our enemies from intelligence among us is as valuable a head.”, just like he recommends the organisation of archives with files on all potential problem sources. Already Defoe used his literary work as an alibi during political information gathering, and he thus forms a prototypical example of a practical connection between the author’s and the intellectual’s free, philandering lifestyle and their potential use for intelligence purposes.

“Existential correlate” and enunciation

Both the detective, the agent, and the front pig novels are meaningless without some version or degree of a first person narrator perspective - without which the elementary suspense of these genres is difficult to
maintain. Omniscient narrators, especially with respect to the time aspect, but also with regard to the inner life of many persons, would spoil these effects, apart from the fact that they would seem unnatural with their unrealistically, unavailable amount of knowledge. But the spy novel seems even more tied to the first person perspective than the other two, in regard to time, space, and persons, because the first person perspective is a prototypical point of view for the experience of radical insecurity.

This leads to the question of what could be called the “existential correlate” of these genres, that is, their iconic relation to other domains on a higher, secondary level of iconicity, connecting to the fifth iconicity type of ch. 17, that of the “metaphysical qualities”. We should of course not suppose that the legitimacy of these genres lies only in their ability to allegorize basic existential experiences for the reader. There is a huge amount of direct information about espionage ontology as well as empirical facts of real milieus and experiences in them, and espionage is in itself, moreover, a complicated facet of existence - but all the same it seems to call for an explanation that these genres possess the mass appeal which have made them huge popular genres of the 20. Century. It seems to be connected to the fact that these related genres make possible a bouquet of rather different allegories in relation to other domains of life. The detective genre’s affinity to cool intellectual games, solution of enigmas, intelligence tests, a heart of gold behind the tough appearances, lonely cinema noir rainy day melancholy, etc. probably forms the most well-known of these male cocktails. The front pig genre rather has a connection to fundamental feelings of misfit, hatred towards superordinates and ordinary life, violent reaction, radical and unanimous chosing side, bodily primitivism, and the dream of Männerbünde, the blending of blood and unconditional male friendship. The spy genre, on the other hand, lies on a continuum from idealism over the violation of idealism and to charades, loss of identity, fundamental lack of orientation and insecurity where any firm supposition about reality may vanish and initiate a foggy Nebenwelt in which a dark and somber worldwide destiny develops unpredictably. The spy may despair, but his loneliness is not the outsider’s like the detective’s, it is rather the loneliness of being tied to an irreversible position in a structural paranoia where any figure like in a puzzle picture may all of a sudden change into its opposite. The connection to politics is of course direct and in no way allegorical, but in addition to that, these structures seem to give the spy genre a special relationship to love and religion, maybe even the more dark and despairing aspects of the two. Love, jealousy, sex, and so on play marginal roles for the detective and the front pig who may deal with these
matters in a unashamed Hemingwayian toughness; for Marlowe or Kelly’s Heroes women are interesting staffage but no intrinsic issue - but these issues are evidently generic in spy literature. Already in the objectivity itself, there is a connection, cf. the classic features of female spies, both as honeytraps, patiently waiting for the appearance of the classical pillow talk (while maybe the seances are filmed or in other ways documented for use in blackmail)xxix. Here, a common sense insecurity as to the continuum between sex and love is mirrored in a continuum between sex and blackmail. But in addition to these structures in espionage itself, the stable occurrence of these themes in spy literature is probably motivated in the structural analogies in the respective domains which make them obvious to use as allegories for each other. To many literary spies, the mysteries of love seem to be realities into which you may flee when the insecurity on the first level becomes unbearable - just to discover that a structurally analogous insecurity repeats itself at the second level.

A similar analogy of structure which may be a reason behind the popularity of the genre, is theology. We have already remarked upon Carl Schmitt’s idea of the theological genealogy of modern political science concepts. Theology becomes - via the deism of Enlightenment - constitutional law; the priest becomes the lawyer; God becomes the sovereign; epiphany becomes the state of emergency. You may continue the parallels yourself: the religious community and the heathens become friend and foe, respectively; atheism and doubt become the ideologies of the bourgeoisie (the “discussing” class trying to evade decision). Just like faith makes only sense for a believer, thus politics requires, according to Schmitt, “existentielle Teilhaben”. It is not necessary to join Schmitt in his fascist conclusions to these analogies in order to see the spy novel as intensely occupied by a theology of the statexxx. Democracy, to Schmitt, was a naïve belief in the possibility of the definitive extermination of sovereignty; for a more cool point of view, democracy is rather a strong - if not the only - means to contain and control a sovereign position which may not be exterminated, and among the chief political virtues of democracy is precisely the fact that you need not be existentially aroused by it in order to claim your rights as a political citizen. But the position of sovereignty in democracies is precisely located in the secret services and the (most often, small) central parts of the political elite controlling them. In and around the intelligence organizations, all the theological paradoxes repeat themselves. This goes for the political science understanding of them, but also for the participants: the continuum in espionage from existential bottomlessness and to idealist
confession mirrors the continuum from doubt to faith, and just like the ways of the Lord are past understanding, even for the believer, so exactly the same holds for the ways of the State, even for the most devoted spy. He becomes a mystic of the state, be it real or dreamt-up, serving an enigmatic entity which by its very nature never can be met with face to face, which he may only meet in his own doubtful deeds where any victory is provisional, open to dispute and maybe even a defeat in disguise. In theology, the spy novel thus finds another ‘existential correlate’ - and with it all the passions, the rare epiphanies, and the dark-nights-of-the-soul - both in dogmatic theology and popular belief versions.

But here, the espionage novel adds to these existential passions a cool and comfortable objectivation in so far as they are here played out in full intersubjective orchestration. In doing so, the spy genre may stage these existential and theological structures without the first person perspective leading to orgies of expressive psychologisms. Most often, the first person perspective is - in spite of its status as point-of-view - minimally described, exactly because the objective scenario of the plot stages the existential figures. This allows for a cool and objective rendering of structures which in other genres may be given rather juicy and self-indulgent psychological descriptions. xxxi This force of the spy novel may be that it orchestrates the passion of the state at the same time as it provides an objective iconic tool to grasp certain Ingardenian “metaphysical qualities”, the bottomlessness of love, existence, faith, and doubt: a stable instrument to understand a set of basic insecurities.

**Iconicity in espionage representation**

To conclude, a basic condition of possibility for the spy novel lies in its iconic use of basic a priori structures of espionage in an Ingarden iconicity type 4). A basic outline of this schema can be found in the presuppositions of any definition of the word spy. A further analysis demonstrates a series of structural corollaries to this spy definition:

1) the spy as a special moment of the narratological hero (as opposed to the related characters, the detective and the front pig)
2) the positional character of the spy - the possession of secret knowledge as determination independent of any espionage intention or affiliation in the person in question
3) a tendential structural difference between foreign and domestic services
4) two types of basic insecurities in any espionage hierarchy: one top-down insecurity eroding the superordinates’ trust in the subordinates. And one bottom-up insecurity inflicted by the “compartmentalization” of secret services, eroding the spy’s trust in the organization employing him.

5) the secrecy and insecurities of espionage makes fiction a virtual aspect of every factual writing about it. These basic ontological features of espionage are iconically reproduced in the spy novel genre and contributes to its very definition as such. The fifth property, moreover, implies a particular, intrinsic relation - and iconicity - between the role of authors and the role of spies.

Finally, the clarification of these basic diagrammatical properties of espionage makes possible a hypothesis about a second-order iconicity holding between the espionage novel and the metaphysical qualities of other discourses, namely those of love and of theology. These two fields structurally share the basic insecurities of espionage which is why it may be used iconically to address, more or less directly, and more or less allegorically, central problems of love and religion.

Thus, iconicity is at stake in at least two different aspects. Basically, an iconicity between espionage as such and the novels about it is made possible by shared diagrammatical semantics. On this basis, other important iconic relations become possible, namely those between spies and authors and those between espionage on the one hand and love and religion on the other.

This conclusion forms an empirical case against two ideas of the relation between iconicity and literature. One is the skepticist idea that iconicity should play no role at all in literature and that, consequently, it should be possible to describe literary issues with literary theoretical concepts only. Against this, it may be argued that the very existence of stable genres - as for instance the spy novel - point to iconical, realist foundations outside of literature proper. Another is the idea that iconicity in literature should concern only the relation between expression and content (like figure poems, basically). Against this, it may be argued that a more basic iconicity concerns also the relation between meaning and reference, in this case between a literary subgenre and a schematic a priori structure defining its domain of reference.

Our attempt at charting the regional ontology of espionage took its point of departure in the necessary presuppositions to a dictionary definition of “spy”. Our further development of this ontological structure involved theoretical and empirical observations and investigations from a host of rather different sources. This point to the special conditions of charting
regional ontological structure. Even if a priori, such structures may not be fruitfully investigated by pure armchair speculation only. Even if basically diagrammatical, such knowledge must base itself on the analyses of the empirically presented structure of the field, pendling back and forth between a purely diagrammatical grasp of regional necessity regularities on the one hand and empirical concepts produced in the ongoing scientific and other research in the field.
Clausewitz’s *Vom Kriege* is even remarkably sparse as to observations on the role of espionage in warfare; all is a 1-page chapter about “Nachrichten im Krieg” containing little exceeding common sense: “Ein grosser Teil der Nachrichten, die man im Kriege bekommt, ist widersprechend, ein noch größerer ist falsch und bei weitem der größte einer ziemlichen Ungewißheit unterworfen.” (48)

In the case of espionage, we meet such structures in the recurrent, transhistorical claims about the nature, essence, principles, or problems of espionage in spy literature. In *Spys and Spymasters*, e.g., we read about 20th-century espionage that “Though considerate advances had been made in technology, the basic principles and problems of intelligence remained unchanged.” (144). In the same vein, we are told that as to the human element of espionage “... nothing had changed since the days of Joshua.” (146). Such general ideas are subsequently applied in the analyses of specific subjects, as when the espionage satellites of the 20th Century are seen as evolutionary heirs to the balloons of the 18th century. They, in turn, had the function “… to take one stage further the instruction Moses gave to his spies: “Go up into the mountain, and see the land!” (166).

Smith has thus founded a center for philosophy and geography and conceives of political geography as an exemplary case for a priori studies, e.g., of border types. The idea of such a relation between reality and semantics remains, though, controversial. The present paper has thus been turned down by several distinguished scholarly journals, not because of its quality (at least, so they claimed), but because of the fact that it included real-world issues in the discussion of a literary genre and thus was deemed unfit for literary studies.

In an arbitrarily selected dictionary, *Nudansk Ordbog*, Copenhagen: Politiken 1977. This procedure is inspired by Greimas’s investigation of the concepts “challenge” and “anger”, in Greimas 1982.

A prominent example is the allies’ large-scale deception operation before D-day in order to make Hitler believe the Dunkirk area to be the invasion spot, including not only a planning of a feinted invasion there but also the planning of a feinted feint, a more northerly invasion supposed to take place from Scotland, thus adding further credibility to the Dunkirk possibility.

I believe this is not generally acknowledged, and among many literary scholars, Greimas even counts as an especially malignant reductionist. This rests, however, upon a misinterpretation of Greimas’ “narrative schema” as an assumedly identical deep structure underlying all concrete texts. This idea overlooks a crucial moment in all decent structuralisms: the concept of transformation, cf. ch. 5. The schema is a prototype only which must be transformed in order to grasp the single text’s specificity. The specific features of the single text is grasped only by understanding - not only the schema - but the specific transformation (and its motivations and implications) resulting in just that text. Moreover, the schema may develop with the addition of further assumptions which make new aspects of the fight appear. The schema is not a causal regularity, it is a teleological regularity, and hence it may bifurcate at every possible joint, failing to satisfy the telos in question. The simple phases of it are not causally determined by earlier phases; rather, later phases presuppose earlier phases.
Here sociological criteria enter: espionage does not seem to have been anomalous in GDR, for instance, measured on what is known about the number of informants in the people employed by the Stasi, and generally espionage is considerably less controversial in pre-democratic or totalitarian states. But even here, the anomalous character is preserved in the secrecy of procedures.

Carl Schmitt’s personal career is highly controversial, involving extreme right wing positions and active support for the Nazi regime in the 30’s. Despite Schmitt’s dubious - to say the least - political positions, it is possible to discuss his more general philosophical and scientific points of view on a democratic basis. Schmitt’s notion of sovereignty is explicitly copied from theological concepts, cf. the hypothesis of Politische Theologie that the concepts of modern political theory are constituted by secularized theology. A corollary is that fundamental political and politological issues inherit structures from theology; the political wars of the largely atheist 20. Century support this idea, cf. also Vögelin’s notion of religious politics. It is easy to recognize the problems of incarnation and of theodicée in relation to espionage: how may democratic ideas become flesh? How may democracy be morally good when its own secret services are not?

Schmitt does not explicitly claim this, but the idea clearly appears, e.g. in Der Begriff des Politischen, (p. 34n) where the famous dictum of Clausewitz is interpreted with the conclusion that politics is determined by the Friend-or-Foe logic of war.

The latter expression is, surprisingly, rather new and dates back only to American discussions in the beginning of the Cold War.

We presuppose, of course, that the Prussians did not have the possibility of incarcerating the two and keep them as prisoners of war. We may note en passant that according to John Keegan, it was the Prussians’ victory in the Franco-German war which made Clausewitz an international hero in military academies worldwide. This development formed part of the radical brutalization of war during the 20. century supported by Clausewitz’s idea of the war as tending to the utmost release of violence and aiming at the total defeat of the enemy.

Brandt 1983, p. 129.

Analogous cases occurred in USA during the same period - president Kennedy’s affair with Judy Exner whom he shared with mafioso Sam Giancana, just like his affairs with the East German girl Ellen Rometsch and several upper class whores with connections to the Profumo case. These affairs were only made silent due to intensive emergency work by Robert Kennedy and J. Edgar Hoover (according to Hersh 1998).

With Jens-Martin Eriksen, I wrote two books about the Balkan wars of the 90s and the actual predicaments of the region (2003, 2004).

According to West, p. 296-7.

Famous is the alleged refusal of the USA to perpetuate the services in the period between the World Wars, with reference to the fact that “gentlemen do not read each other’s mail”.

The military function is the second function out of the three in Dumézil’s theory of three main functions in Indo-European culture: justice/magic, war, fertility.)

We may remark the British military historian John Keegan’s empirical claim that the Napoleonic revolutionary armies with their general conscription played a decisive role in the democratization of Europe.

Of course, military intelligence is subject to the same control, but the recurrent and delicate political tension between state security and the human rights of the same state’s citizens is structurally relevant for domestic services primarily.

Cf. the Swedish conflict researcher Ola Tunander’s work on the Palme case.

When senator Moynihan (cf. below), after having served under Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford, was elected to Senate, he got admission to his own FBI file of 561 pages, naming him as a communist.

In one of the rare cases of principal reflection on these issues - the last chapter of former CIA-boss Allen Dulles’s book *The Craft of Intelligence* (1963) - he claims that the president himself controls the services, that Dulles himself has supported a proposal for a civil control commission, that all his own knowledge of the services gives reason for trust: “After more than a decade of service, I can testify that I have never known a group of men and women more devoted to the defense of our country and its way of life than those who are working in the Central Intelligence Agency.” (p. 264). Apart from the fact that a natural scepticism easily awakens faced with claims like these from the leader’s own lips, it remains correct that assumptions like the ones quoted is all that you have to rest your head on. On the other hand, Dulles adds immediately afterwats, as the very last two sentences of the book that “The last thing we can afford to do today is to put our intelligence in chains. Its protective and informative role is indispensable in an era of unique and continuing danger.” (264). Dulles thus summarizes in a few lines all possible points of view: control, trust, limitation of control ...

A recent Danish example is the schoolmaster Kristian Kjær Nielsen who recently (in the Danish daily *Information* March 10th 99) told about how, as a member of the Danish Neo-Nazi Party DNSB in the seventies, he spied on party comrades. The information he collected was delivered anonymously by P.O.Box in Copenhagen, and the spy had never any clear idea as to who his commissioners were. Obvious candidates included Israeli, West German, and Danish intelligence services, just like Jewish organizations for the tracing of World War II criminals is a possibility.

Moynihan relates, not without comical effects, how general Butler, one of the main responsible for the American atomic strategy, visited the Soviet Union for the first time in 1988 and got a shock. Everything is falling apart, and the chauffeur in the official limousine transporting him breaks off the gear stick. After all these years, Butler in a split second realizes that he has been dealing all along with a caricature (pp. 78-9). Moynihan himself tells about a parallel experience regarding the Sandinistas in Nicaragua where he, as an official guest, is witness to the Secretary of Interior trying in vain to order beans at a restaurant - all at the same time as the illegal Iran-Contra scandal develops on a CIA automat idea that the Sandinist state should be a strong and dangerous enemy (p. 208-12). Instead, Moynihan’s proposal would be that a “…reasonable American response to the new Communist government in Managua would have been a statement of condolence.” (207)

We may note that the postmodernist sceptic Jean Baudrillard took his most salient examples for his radical idea of the “disappearance of the real” from the world of secret services. Who was responsible for the Italian terror bombs of the seventies and eighties? - many different groupings claimed responsibility, maybe it was instructed by one political wing in order to discredit the other, maybe by the police in order to discredit both, maybe by foreign interests in destabilising Italy ... reality vanishes behind such interpretations and their effects.

I pick these informations from Haswell 1979, p. 48f.

The first organized use of this effect was probably Bismarck’s famous espionage chief Wilhelm Stieber who was the father of many classical espionage inventions. He erected the so-called “Greenhouse” in Berlin, an especially sophisticated and depraved whorehouse, with the intention of its use in blackmail of its customer circle involved in international politics.

An explicit example supporting this idea being of course Graham Greene the catholic.

Maybe this fact gives part of an explanation of the often-noticed but relatively unexplained partition of the film and literature public into two segments: a masculine segment preferring the detectives, front pigs, spies, thrill, and objective action of B-movies, while a feminine segment wants, doctors, artists, love, children, passion in melodramas with full possibilities of heavy psychological identification. Nobody could possibly overlook this, least of all Hollywood, still it seems anathema for academic investigation in most of literature and film departments.