

Ch. 17 of *Diagrammatology. An Investigation in Phenomenology, Ontology, and Semiotics*, Dordrecht 2007: Springer Verlag, 345-364.

Adapted for "Five types of literary iconicity", in C. Ljungberg, J. Dines Johansen, and H. Veivo (eds.). *Redefining Literary Semiotics*, Cambridge Scholars' Publishing, 33-60.

Five Types of Schematic Iconicity in the Literary Text

– an extension of the Ingardenian viewpoint

We have already encountered Husserl's theory of fictionality (defined by the "quasi" attitude) as well as his gradual realization that fictions and pictures possess an ideal quality – to the extent that none of them are fully determinate and thus necessarily contain *Unbestimmtheiten*. These observations form the point of departure for his famous pupil Roman Ingarden who is well-known for being the phenomenologist who earliest and most thoroughly worked out the foundations of a phenomenological aesthetics in general and a phenomenological theory of the literary work in particular.ⁱ What is less well known is that at the same time as Ingarden developed these possibilities within Husserlian phenomenology, he undertook this enormous work in order to correct what he conceived as a fallacy in the heart of phenomenology, namely Husserl's transcendental turn towards transcendental idealismⁱⁱ. Ingarden saw little difference between Husserl's understanding of fictitious objects after the "quasi"-mode on the one hand, and the reformulation of his theory in *Ideen* where the object pole of phenomenological acts under the concept of *noema* was made a consciousness-immanent entity, on the other. So transcendental idealism, in Ingarden's account, treated the whole world as a fiction. The initial impetus for Ingarden's obsession with phenomenological aesthetics was thus to develop it to an extent where the crucial difference between real and fictive objects became evident. Thus, Ingarden's aesthetics, beginning with his chef-d'œuvre *Das literarische Kunstwerk* (1931) and continuing with *Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerks* (1938, 1966) and numerous other aesthetic investigations, has a double aim: one, of course, is to found an aesthetics on a phenomenological basis, the other, to provide ontological arguments for philosophical realism – such as it is finally laid out in the unfinished three-volume work *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt* (1966-74).ⁱⁱⁱ

The literary work is thus placed as non-real as opposed to ordinary reality – and this crucial idea is argued on the basis of two observations: the *objects* to which it refers are quasi-objects merely, referred to by quasi-judgments. And the literary work *itself* is non-real, albeit in another meaning of the word: it is general, schematic, and (in a certain sense) ideal. While the former of these reasons is what allows Ingarden to counter the basis of Husserl's idealism, the latter is what forms the basis of his own theory of the literary work, a theory which is, in many respects, the direct heir to Husserl's own theories of fictions and pictures (cf. ch. 14).

Here, we shall discuss Ingarden's detailed theory of the literary work with emphasis on the implications of his ideas about the *schematic* character of the work – or, to put in a Peircean vein, the *diagrammatical* character of it.

Ingarden's account for the structure of the literary work contains, as is well known, four *Schichten*, four strata, levels, or layers: the level of word sounds, the level of meanings, the level of represented objectivities, and the level of schematized aspects. As is evident, the three of these levels roughly correspond to aspects of the sign which have been discussed at least since Aristotle: its expression, its content, and its reference. The fourth stratum, the level of schematized aspects is not part of average sign definitions – but stems from a phenomenologically classical idea, namely Husserl's observation in *Ideen* that perceived objects may never be grasped in their totality but only through one or several out of a huge variety of possible "profiles" or aspects, dependent on which point-of-views they are perceived from. The basic set of conceptual tools in Ingarden's account is thus surprisingly general and deals with perceptual and linguistic issues not specific to literature. Thus it is no wonder that something like 90 percent of *Das literarische Kunstwerk* is spent on the construction of an ambitious phenomenological linguistics – the main part of whose results covers any language use whatsoever. When Ingarden talks about "the literary work", it thus also includes e.g. scientific treatises, and only a minor part of *Das literarische Kunstwerk* is spent on outlining the specificity of the literary work of art – in *Vom Erkennen* he further tries to single out the precise difference between scientific texts and literary works of art. When it comes down to what distinguishes a literary work of art from any old literary work, the answer is threefold, added on top of the linguistic theory: it is the special use of schematized aspects in order to making intuitive the represented objects; it is the polyphony between the way the four levels are articulated in the particular work – and it is the evanescent "metaphysical qualities" which

the work – if successful - is able to manifest: the humorous, the tragic, the merry, etc. This is not to say, however, that the pheno-linguistic doctrine he presents as its foundation is trivial, quite on the contrary. Let us run through the single levels of the construction.

The level of word sounds is probably the least problematic – even if an already classic criticism adds to it the fact that most literary works have their privileged form of existence as printed books, so that the graphic form properly ought to be included in this level. This is, however, possible without major problems. *Das literarische Kunstwerk* is written simultaneously with the first articulations of linguistic structuralism in Prague (which was, through Jakobson, heavily influenced by Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* just like Ingarden), so it is no wonder that Ingarden's account for the level of word sounds bears resemblance to the structuralist idea of the duality between phonology and phonetics. To Ingarden, word sounds are, just like the other parts of the work, general – they do not consist of the physical acoustic sounds which are uttered in any single, inner or outer, reading of the work (nor of the physical instances of grapheme series constituting the correlating book, for that matter). The level of word sounds consists of *types* – the word sound type is constant from one use to the next, and thus different from the "phonic material" in which it incarnates in each single case of expression. This "ideality" (Ingarden would not use that word in this connection) or generality of the word sound of course has functional reasons. The word sound expresses one and the same meaning and hence must be as identical as the meaning itself. (38) On this proto-structuralist basis, a series of further ideas are added: a distinction between "lifeless" as opposed to "living", "vibrant", "powerful" words, of which scientific terms serve as an example of the former, while the latter have certain onomatopoeic qualities: "... the characters which arise from the purely phonetic "Gestalt qualities" and move from the meaning onto the word sound reveal themselves more clearly in the word sound and color it, so to speak, with the quality that is characteristic of the designated object ..." (44) This poetic function – to use Jakobson's terminology – plays a crucial role in the contribution of the word sound level to the polyphony of the whole work as well as in Ingarden's account for the schematized aspects. Phonetic formations of higher orders include all the well-known effects of rhythm and tempo, melody, rhyme, assonance, tone, etc. and the fact that they are all part of the contribution of the word sound level to the specific polyphony of the work of art is hardly surprising.

The analysis of the meaning level takes up a huge part of Ingarden's doctrine, and it indeed forms an ambitious outline of his phenomenological

linguistics with its base in Husserl's 3rd and 4th logical investigations. It forms a first outline of what was to become Ingarden's ontology in *Streit* and provides the clue to language (and hence, literature) as a schematic construct. Like in Husserl's 4th investigation, the two autonomous meaning units are the noun and the sentence, respectively – while the syncategoremata, Ingarden's "functional words" do not possess an autonomous meaning. And like in Husserl's 5th investigation, a composite act structure is taken as the basis of intentional directedness. Its version regarding the account of the meaning of names differs, however, significantly from Husserl's version: it consists of 1) the intentional directional factor (the reference being singular or multiply oriented (single-rayed or multi-rayed), being actual or potential, being stable or variable, etc.), 2) the material content (the qualitative constitution of the object), 3) the formal content (the ontic status of the object – it being a substance, a thing, a quality, a state etc.), 4) the moment of existential characterization (whether the object is real, ideal, etc.), and in some cases 5) the moment of existential position (whether the object is a fact or a fiction). Verbs, on the other hand, are completion-requiring – not unlike Peircean rhemes.

An important notion here is the distinction between the actual and potential "stock of meaning" (84). Any specific use of a word actualizes an aspect of its ideal sense – and the other merely potential aspects of meaning may now be indirectly present in intonation in spoken language, and, in written language, by means of reference to the "system of meanings" to which the word belongs, and by means of the localization of the word in different contexts, each of them selecting among the possible stock of meaning. (88) These indirect ways of indicating possible meanings Ingarden calls "suggestions" or "readily potential meanings" as opposed to possible meanings not so indicated – in the course of a work, a word may collect many such suggested possible meanings. This is supposed to cover both material and formal aspects of meaning – and this whole idea becomes important in order to understand Ingarden's difficult notion of "schematized aspects".

First, it is this outline of a linguistics which permits Ingarden to ask the questions leading to his basic idea of the ontology of language and of literature. For such meanings of words, sentences, and sentence complexes, are they not ideal objects? In a certain sense, the most decidedly are. They are identical from one use to the next (as a prerequisite to the possibility of understanding), this identity is not numerical (*Faust* remains one work, whether it is printed in a circulation of 2000 or of 200.000), their kind of existence is not physical (if it was physical, then each single copy of *Faust*

would be a different work), it does not exist at a single, specifiable location in time and space. This was what led Husserl to assume the ideality of meanings (and furthermore to outline the (later abandoned) species theory of meaning in the *Logische Untersuchungen* with the idea that the meaning of an expression is simply the species of the correlated act). Ingarden admits all these arguments against meanings and literary works being real objects. But still they can not be ideal objects in the same sense as logical truths, geometrical objects, or mathematical regularities nor material essences – for they come into being at certain specific points of time in history, they may disappear again, and, unlike these genuinely ideal objects, they invariably depend on subjective intention for their existence: they require the existence of speakers, authors, and readers. If they were really ideal objects, they would not come into being at specifiable points and would, in some sense, have timeless existence, only waiting to be discovered by the author. Hence they form prime examples of Ingarden's third ontological category, in some sense intermediary between ideal and real: *pure intentional objects* (100). They are heteronomous, because they depend on subjective intentions for their existence, they require physical support for their existence, and they may refer, in turn, to any kind of objects, be they real, ideal, or imagined. It is they that generally constitute the basis for the reference of propositions. In ordinary cases, the pure intentional object so to speak remains invisible, because the object referred to is seen through the correlated pure intentional object. Only in cases like faulty reference or fictitious reference does the pure intentional object become visible as such.

Even if pure intentional objects are ultimately dependent on the intentionality of acts of consciousness, the ontic relativity of the objects represented does not refer directly back to such intentionality, but to an intentionality immanent in the units of meaning – constituted by the fact of communication and of its necessity to be able identically to reproduce a meaning from one occasion to another. This shift implies an advantage as well as a loss. The advantage is that meanings, unlike e.g. perceptions, cease to be completely subjective formations and thus become intersubjective – the loss is that the lack of richness and completeness, dependent on single intentions, makes of the meaning a "skeleton", a "schema" only. (126-7) Thus the schematic character of the literary work lies already in the basic linguistic schematization of meaning. To say that schematization is a loss, however, might be seen as a strange *façon de parler* – it should rather be seen as a gain, because it is schematization that permits thought economy, plasticity of reference as well as experimentation possibility. These enormous benefits, it is true, are bought at the price of a loss of richness.

Pure intentional objects imply a special use in Ingarden of the phenomenological notion of *Sachverhalt* – state of affairs. Thus he claims that the pure intentional objects constitute in themselves states-of-affairs – no matter whether any real or ideal correlate exists or not. On the other hand, such correlates are, if they exist, states-of-affairs in themselves.^{iv} The former use of the concept of states-of-affairs thus gives rise to subtle determinations like the following: "... the states-of-affairs created and developed by the sentence is transcendent with respect to the sentence content yet, according to its essence, belongs to it." (116) Such "purely intended states of affairs" differ from states of affairs pertaining to an "ontic sphere" (real or ideal) being autonomous in relation to the sentence, and even if their existence is heteronomous in relation to the sentence and finds its ontic basis in sentences, they are, on the other hand, transcendent in relation to them.

This forms the basis of the next level, the level of represented objects or objectivities. They form the only "thematically apprehended" stratum of the work (217) – that is, the whole edifice apart from the objectivities are only implicitly part of the immediately experienced work. The reader focuses upon the objects dealt with in the work. The object^v is, of course, not directly grasped from the sentence meanings of the text. These sentence meanings refer to, as we have seen, states-of-affairs, and it is these states-of-affairs which permit, in turn, the access to the objectivities represented. The purely intentional sentence correlate is not – unlike the existing state-of-affairs it may refer to – completely determined (142). As state-of-affairs, it is already schematic – or ideal in the sense of the word that it may be repeated identically. This implies, on the other hand, that it may be ambiguous – it may, for instance, contain mutually contradictory parts which gives it what Ingarden calls "opalescence" or "iridescence", fluctuating indeterminability.^{vi} The status of the object level depends on the special character of the propositions realized in sentences on the meaning level. They organize a continuum from referring only to purely intentional objects in one end and to referring to autonomously existing objects in the other. The correlative propositions Ingarden names "pure affirmative" and "genuine judicative" propositions, respectively – the former roughly corresponding to Meinong's "assumptions" ("Annahmen") which do not involve any existence claims.^{vii} On this continuum, the quasi-judgments characteristic of the literary work are located.^{viii} The "ontic setting" of a real world of genuine propositions is maintained, but the "matching intention" (between pure intentional and existing objects) and "identification" (with a sphere of existence) are left out. The intentionally projected states-of-affairs thus form "their own world" – which may deviate to larger and lesser

degrees from the real world. The purely intentional states-of-affairs already belong to the object stratum (188) – they form so to speak the bridge from meaning stratum to object stratum: "Since the same object can be revealed in various differently constructed states-of-affairs – since the state-of-affairs are like many windows through which we can look into one and the same house, each time from a different standpoint and from a different side, into another part, or finally, for a second time through the same window – a certain cleavage occurs in the "stratum of objects" of the literary work. In their representation function the states of affairs are that which represents, while the objects constituted within them are the represented. But since the state of affairs is at the same time something which belongs to the proper ontic range of the object (constituted within it), this representation is in the final analysis a *self*-representation of the object in what belongs to it."

We give this long quote because it pinpoints the difficult relationship between meaning and object levels – and at the same time involves the fourth and last level, the stratum of *schematisierte Ansichten*, of "schematized aspects". We so to speak look through the states-of-affairs (cf. the window metaphor) in order to reach the represented objects "and have them as *given*." (191), while the medium itself is usually not thematically in the foreground, but remain in the background. Another metaphor for the same is that the different states-of-affairs so to speak capture the objectivities: "... the states of affairs, figuratively speaking, merge into a "net" in which the given object is "ensnared"" (157), or that it is as if "a beam of light were illuminating a part of a region, the remainder of which disappears in an indeterminate cloud but is still there in its indeterminacy." (218)

This implies a delicate relationship between the states of affairs and the objectivities. The latter is constituted out of a manifold of connected states-of-affairs. The way they connect these states of affairs is seemingly one of continuous merging: the limits between the single states of affairs pertaining to the same objectivity are artificial, and they are fused into one complex. This process thus forms a formal equivalent to Husserl's famous analysis of perception and the synthesis of the perceived object from profiles; the object, on its side, being able to give rise to potentially a continuous infinity of profiles. But unlike the case in perception, the basis of the synthesis, in the work, does not form a continuous manifold. Rather, this manifold consists of single, isolated sentences with each their meaning and state of affairs correlate – which implies that the object, in Ingarden's metaphor, is so to speak "dispersed, like a ray of light in a prism, in a discrete manifold of distinct, though connected, states of affairs." (159) –

even if this gives us the possibility of selecting a varied range of different, but still only individual states of affairs (198).^{ix}

Thus, represented objectivities – that is, pure intentional objectivities – differ from real objects in a radical manner. Ingarden exemplifies this in his interesting accounts of represented time and space which both differ from real as well as perceived time and space by being schematic because constructed from a finite number of meaning units. While real objects – unlike the case in Peirce – are supposed to be unanimously and universally determined, with all determinations fitting consistently into one whole, and being absolutely individual, so that ideas in them are incarnated or individualized at the lowest possible level of differentiation – pure intentional objects, on the other hand, are schematic and thus not thoroughly determined, they are not necessarily consistent, and ideas in them are not necessarily individualized.^x This implies, all in all, that purely intentional objects are schematic. This gives rise to the famous *Unbestimmtheitsstellen*, the spots of indeterminacy, or, as Wolfgang Iser would later call them, the *Leerstellen* – of which there is an infinity (or, as Ingarden would later say, a very large number). The supposedly real object in a quasi-judgment is, hence “... only a formal schema of infinitely many spots of determinacy is projected, but almost all remain unfilled.” (250). This forms the basic reason why the literary work is “in principle incomplete” and thus in need of further supplementation (251) – but it is important here to stress that nothing specifically literary has yet been said by this. It goes for any purely intentional object as such and thus for all objects projected by meaning, hence by all language and all (supposedly) sufficiently complex sign use. The reason why we do not experience these spots while reading is threefold: the represented objects are “visible” only through the aspects determined by the choice of meaning units; some of the spots are covered by schematized aspects, and, finally, the reader supplies his own selection of concretizations and thus in a sense “goes beyond” what lies in the text (this giving rise to the important distinction between the literary work and its concretizations which must not, in turn, be confused with their product: the reader’s psychological experience). The flip side of this is the possibility for the work of making radically *new* objects: objects of impossible objects or events, transgressing regional ontological boundaries, making inconsistent states of affairs – even until “two different worlds are struggling for supremacy.” It follows from this that Ingarden’s final aesthetic criterion of polyphonic organicity is not to be taken for any sort of glib harmony, as it has sometimes been maintained as an argument against him – quite on the contrary, such clashing phenomena on the object level may constitute part of the work’s aesthetic quality. The

reader's activity in selecting concretizations of such spots forms a major issue in Ingarden's follow-up work *Vom Erkennen des literarischen Werkes*.

That such a concretization is performed in reading the literary work follows from the fact that we most often do not experience its objectivities as indeterminate; we experience them actually as analogues to "whole", naturally perceived objects. It is as if the "net" of states-of-affairs catching the represented objectivity merges into a continuous sheet, meticulously following the shape of the object. How is the finite set of purely intentional states of affairs in the literary work to some extent "restored" to yield something analogous to a perceived object?

The reason for this lies in the fourth level, that of schematized aspects. Shortly described, this stratum is that which makes it possible for us to reach intuitively satisfactory, perception-like syntheses of the objects represented. Still, its basis and ways of functioning belong to the most difficult and least clarified parts of Ingarden's doctrine. An otherwise diehard Ingarden fan like René Wellek simply bluntly dismisses the existence of such a level and subsumes it under the represented objectivities.^{xi} Already in the account for the synthesis of purely intentional states of affairs, two important ideas stand out. Ingarden distinguishes three types of states of affairs, pertaining to appearances, essences, and occurrences, respectively (*Soaussehensverhalten*, *Soseinsverhalten*, and *Geschehensverhalten*). In a few pages (192-96), Ingarden outlines a trans-phrastic theory of the interlinking of such states of affairs over the sentence level: while the essence states of affairs constitute a kind of kernels, the appearance states of affairs allow the connection of them to "a possible subject", while the occurrence states of affairs with their event quality permit the interlinking of essence states. The occurrence states " ... have the capacity to exhibit the objects partaking in the respectively developed occurrences to a much greater degree than do pure states of essence." (195) – an almost pragmatic (in Peirce's sense) idea: effects are what matters in the understanding of an object: states of occurrences "to a certain extent *exhibit themselves*" (ibid). They thus facilitate the formation of "a system of "realized mutually interconnected states of essence" (ibid.) and contribute to the "representing, and frequently also to the exhibiting, of entire segments of the world of objects." (196). Even if the three state types mentioned may thus form an interconnected web of states (governed, of course, by all kinds of narrative, thematic and other gestalt structures on the object side, we may add), they still not suffice to mend the finitude of state of affairs nor enter into full intuitive givenness like in sense-perception^{xii}.

This "intuitivization" (197) in imagination is channeled by the interconnected states of affairs – and by the schematized aspects.

"Aspect" of course refers to Husserl's analysis of perception and the objects presenting themselves through a continuous manifold of perceived profiles, "Ansichten" or aspects – so that there is a "... strict affiliation between every perceptually given property of a thing and the manifold of aspects, strictly ordered, according to rules, in which the given property appears." (262). This implies that the very idea of a "property" is, in itself, a certain "idealization" of the set of profiles, it is in itself a "*skeleton, a schema*, of concrete, flowing, transitory aspects" (no two concrete aspects being identical – while one property may be identical from one object to the other – so already in the concept of invariant property a high degree of generality is present). This property obtained by idealization *is* the schematized aspect – and the single, concrete aspects are now variations within the limits set by the schematic aspect to which they belong. In the work, they have the "basis of their determination and, in a certain sense, their potential existence in the states of affairs projected by the sentences or in the objects represented by means of the states of affairs." (264) – in any case, their immediate base in the work is the states of affairs. Such schematized aspects lie predetermined in, e.g. a novel's representation of Paris, and must be filled in – to a larger or lesser degree – by the reader. Just like the case with perceived objects, all schematized aspects in which they may be given belong to the represented objects – but, and this is Ingarden's crucial hypothesis at this point – they are potential only and in order for some of them to be evoked and reach a degree of intuitive givenness, other factors than the represented objects must intervene. Some of the schematized aspects of the represented objects are to some degree "held in readiness", prepared for actualization. The factors determining this partly lie in the states of affairs: the thus-appearance of objects and the exhibiting as against the simple representation of the object. Such aspects thus lie in between potentiality and actuality (obviously, the Peircean notion of "real possibility" of tendencies and patterns is relevant here). And they partly lie in the well-known figural tools of poetic language: metaphors, images, similes, etc. And finally they lie in Ingarden's favorite (but rarely concretized) example of special word sound patterns, onomatopoeically suggesting certain schematized aspects of an object to be selected, or word sounds referring to specific contexts of linguistic use (that is, referring to different Bakhtinian discourses).

The common ground for these only sketchily described bases of the readymaking of certain schematized aspects is as evident their *indirect* character. Direct reference to schematized aspects, on the contrary, immediately makes of the aspect an *explicit* object (which may then lie open for study in different ways), but this does not result in the (partly) intuitive givenness aimed at, because the object originally referred to will disappear and the aspect taking its place as object instead (this, in fact, will be a case of Peircean "hypostatic abstraction"). The objects are what is described, but to some extent this description takes place *through* the schematized aspects held in readiness. This forms, as it were, Ingarden's version of the old Hollywood motto: *show, don't tell* – the latter being equivalent to the making explicit the aspects held in readiness. But the aspects themselves are "jumpy", just like the interconnected web of states of affairs (again, as against continuous, perceptual aspects) - and most often only a few selected aspects are held in readiness. Moreover, they are actualized in imagination only. This is why the degree of vividness of actualized intuitivization changes all of the time during reading – sometimes objectivity stands out rich with details, other times it shrinks to a skeletonlike structure, and only the important, implicit "stabilization" of aspects prevents us from thematically realizing this highly changing appearance of the object, thereby shattering the truthfulness of the objectivity represented. The same goes for the "murky cloud" from which the actualized aspect emerges (as against the perceived foreground object's embeddedness in its perceived background surroundings). By analogy, this aspect doctrine may be extended to cover our access to mental states in other subjects by means of "internal aspects" making the "soul" referred to appear in a certain determinate state.

A certain enigma seems to be at stake here: the finite patchwork of states of affairs was in need of continuous supplementation in order to be able to intuitively coalesce in a simulation of real perceptive experience. But how should this be accomplished by means of *another* finite set of patches, not even integrated to the same degree as the states of affairs, in the form of schematized aspects? It is as if we expected to get a continuous sheet out of the superposition of two patchwork blankets. Continuing in this metaphor we might say that a superposition of two patchwork quilts would ensure that we encounter a continuity at most points (if the two are suitably arranged), if not in the one patchwork, then in the other. So we would so to speak float along on shifting layers of continuity, and the bumps between the states of affairs would be (most often) eased by continuity in a stabilized schematized aspect ...

In any case, the contrast picture which Ingarden paints of a text deprived of schematized aspects is frightening: the represented objects would be purely blankly intended in the reading and merely thought in a completely unintuitive manner – they would be empty, purely "conceptual" schemata, and one would never have the impression that one was dealing with a "unique, live quasi-reality." (277) Thus, the stratum of schematized aspects play a major role in the literary work of *art* – in fact, this forms part of Ingarden's main description of the artistic character of the work, along with quasi-judgments and metaphysical qualities, while all of the other features of the work, including the spots of indeterminacy, remain characteristic of any linguistic or other utterance whatsoever. Ingarden's chapter on the role of schematized aspects in the literary work is short, however, and strangely poor. The basic points remain that the aspects adorn the objects with real-life-like vividness and richness – even to the extent that they may co-constitute them – and that the aspects add to the polyphony of the whole work their own decorative contribution.

This brings us to the final set of ideas in Ingarden's account: the aesthetic qualities of the work as a whole. One side of this is the said polyphony of the strata, merging into one aesthetically pleasing organic whole (including aesthetically pleasing tensions, contrasts, paradoxes, inconsistencies, impossibilities, etc.). The idea is here that the contributions from the single strata supplement each other in some way, and it is probably the case that no further precise determination can be made of what makes such a whole aesthetically successful in general. The other side of it deals with the famous "metaphysical qualities" which are essences that pertain not to single objects but to whole situations or events – let us give Ingarden's often cited example list: "the sublime, the dreadful, the shocking, the inexplicable, the demonic, the holy, the sinful, the sorrowful, the inescapable brightness of good fortune, as well as the grotesque, the charming, the light, the peaceful, etc." As was evident in the simpler case with the aspects, these qualities are not in any way the direct object of the literary work. They are qualities which in some sense pertain to the object level (even if coloured by the whole of the work's polyphony), but the whole development and structure of the work in some sense embody these qualities and allow them to appear. They should not, of course, be confused with the psychological reactions they may arouse in the reader. In his description of these qualities, Ingarden's dry, phenomenological tone almost gives way to a vitalist, romantic sweep: the metaphysical qualities have a character of "revelation" which puts them into contrast to the "gray, faceless, everyday experiences" (277) – and they do

not allow purely rational determination.^{xiii} They may be experienced only in appropriate situations, on which they must be presumed dependent, and then reveal a "deeper sense" of life (278). The object stratum of the work being heteronomous (dependent upon the meaning level), the qualities associated with this stratum can not be fully realized, but still they may be "concretized": "they simulate their own realization" as Ingarden says (294) – which is what permits the reader, on the other hand, to contemplate them relatively calmly, in the well-known aesthetical distance.

The extension of the schematic aspect category

Now, a whole series of questions remain as to the relation between the synthesized objects caught in the net of states of affairs – and the schematized aspects, tightening this net and making it pseudo-continuous. Let us take a look at some of the main problems.

Some of the problems are indicated, more or less directly, in Ingarden himself. His concept of concretisation of course refers to the filling-in, by the reader, of spots of indeterminacy along with the actualization of aspects held in readiness. This concretization is what provides the reader's experience with a more rich, detailed, perception-like version of the work than the schematic construction explicitly present at the meaning level, and it requires the active participation of the reader's imagination. Still, we should not think that the concretization has the character of rendering the objectivities in the text fully determined and with full perceptual clarity. The case is rather that a very schematic version is substituted by a less schematic – but still schematic – version. Much of the filling-in must be assumed to take place by Peircean "pooh-pooh"-induction tacitly inferring the "standard" or "normal" version of things or aspects not explicitly mentioned in the text – but this "normal", default version has, in itself, general or schematic character and, moreover, this filling-in is by its very nature ordinary and un-pregnant. A related issue is the fact that far from all spots of indeterminacy may be filled-in. In some cases, furthermore, the possibility must be regarded that too much filling-in will spoil the artistic effect (Voltaire: the secret of boring is to tell everything), if for instance the filling-in removes an ambiguity or a generality which formed part of the aesthetic polyphony (while in other cases, the removal of ambiguities may be required and, on the contrary, add to the polyphony).

Ingarden (1968) thus envisages two different ways of reading: one – close to the spontaneous reading – concretizing, as opposed to a more

clinical, analytical reading which consciously seeks to avoid concretizing and keeping the work in its most schematic form possible. Of course, we can add, these two possibilities must constitute the two ends of a continuum with different intermediary possibilities selecting certain types of indeterminacies to be or not to be filled in, and selecting certain aspects to be actualized or not. Furthermore, the "pooh-pooh" filling in makes it necessary to distinguish two types of filling-in, the one thematic and with some degree of perceptual richness, the other one unthematic and thus not perceptually conscious, but rather consisting of the tacit co-representation of implied properties.

This leads to the most important set of issues: how many phenomena in the text have the schematic character admitting spots of indeterminacy – and, correlatively, what in the stratum of meaning provides the foundation of the holding-in-readiness of aspects? Ingarden himself is rather vague on these issues, as we have seen, and these aspects of his theory most decidedly requires a filling-in relating his doctrine to other results in semiotics and text theory.

Ingarden's theory, as often pinpointed, has its immediate background in Husserl's work – the foundation concept, the act theory and the (much-disputed) realism of *Logische Untersuchungen*, the perception theory of the *Ideen* I-II, the meaning theory surfacing in *Cartesianische Meditationen*, the quasi-mode of the writings published in *Hua* XXIII, etc. (cf. ch. 6-8; 14). The schematized aspect theory having its precursor in Husserl's doctrine of perception from *Ideen* I and the "Sinnesschema" of *Ideen* II, places the schematized aspects very close to perceptual experience. But does this necessarily have to be the case? As discussed in ch. 6, Husserl's theory of *kategoriale Anschauung* implies that also categorial – schematic – objects possess their own mode of direct givenness. So do schemata not have aspects? We may address a circle by focusing on its periphery or on some select points on it, on its center, on a circle segment, on an inscribed polygon etc. – these are aspects of the circle in analogy to the different profiles or aspects of a perceived object. We may be able to grasp the entire circle from one such aspect, just like we see the complete object even from one apparent aspect only. The same goes even for abstract complexes not being of the geometrical kind which remains still rather close to perception.

Take for instance scripts or frames – Schank and Abelson's well-known restaurant example (1977) with a script connecting all the aspects of going out eating: selecting a place, ordering a table, going there, waiting to

be shown a table, reading and deciding the menu, calling the waiter, ordering the meal, eating and drinking in a specific order, calling for the waiter to get the bill, paying, tipping, leaving – with side-scripts (going to the toilet, meeting friends and pulling tables together, leaving because the food was awful, etc.). This empirical gestalt configuration evidently has a general, schematic structure. The interesting thing in Ingardenian context is that such a schema permits *both* to function as provider of enormous amounts of spots of indeterminacies (ranging from the location or interior of the place over the other guests to menu details etc. etc.) which may be filled-in in a more and less detailed manner, *and* to function as supporting aspects held in readiness – because very few words referring to such a script are sufficient to evoke the whole script in the mind of the reader (if the words "table", "menu", "waiter" surface in adequate combination, the whole restaurant script may be actualized as *abstract, schematic* aspects held-in-readiness). It seems like Ingarden's focus on perception on the one hand and on word and sentence meanings on the other precludes him from seeing structures like this.

Ingarden's own – rather few - examples of filling-in and aspects held-in-readiness are thought-provoking as to which schemata actually function in them. Take, e.g., his discussion of the corridor walk in Thomas Mann's *Zauberberg* as a successful piece of continuous time representation – here, "... we not only find a manifold of successive, closely interconnected states of affairs representing an almost uninterrupted story, but, at the same time, closely interconnected aspects of corresponding objectivities are imposed on us. [...] ... we see almost continuously before our eyes the pertinent objects in appropriate aspects: first the room, then the corridor, etc. As we pass by, we see everything as it would appear sequentially in reality." (283). What grants the unity of this series of aspects, of course, is not only their sequential ordering in the text (disorderly, expressionist glimpses which are discussed as counterexample, may occur equally ordered), but the mapping of this sequential ordering from the meaning onto the object stratum, kept together by the gestalt figure of source-path-goal. This "kinaesthetic image schema" (Lakoff) here functions as a sort of abstract schema, implicitly present only, which forms part of the filling-in operation necessary to grant the continuous experience of the two patchwork sets of separated states of affairs and separated aspects. Another example displays a similar feature in the discussion of represented space which is "... as if pocked with gaps, which show up as, so to speak, spots of indeterminacy" (224). This conclusion is reached on the basis of the example of a room in a novel: "... a

situation is represented as taking place in a given room and that there is no indication, even by a *single* word, that there is anything outside of this room. [...] If the actually represented space (within the room) does not end at the walls of the room, *it is only because it is the essence of space in general not to have any discontinuity*. It is only through this impossibility of spatial discontinuity that the space outside the room is corepresented: in turn, the space within the room is *corepresented*; in turn, the space within the room consequently becomes a *segment* of space.” (223) But this conclusion implicitly relies on another gestalt: the schema which Lakoff nicknames ”container”, consisting of an inside and an outside separated by a closed boundary. This schema is what makes possible the corepresentation.^{xiv} But where should we seek the foundation of such schemata? Probably in the meaning level: the concept of room prototypically involves the container gestalt, just like the concept of walking along a corridor prototypically involves the source-path-goal gestalt.

The second base of Lakoffian cognitive semantics involves a ripe source of indeterminacy and filling-in possibilities as well: that of the basic level concepts of the psychologist Eleanor Rosch. A certain medium level in concept structure is taken to be basic, that involving cars, chairs, tables, dogs, running, walking, speaking, red, green, etc. The idea is that basic level concepts form the uppermost level where a common schematic image for the corresponding object, aspect or activity is possible, the uppermost level where a schematic motor program for interacting with the object, aspect, or activity is possible – which is why such concepts are easiest to learn and in most languages are associated with short, central word sounds. This opposes basic level concepts to more specified concepts on the one hand, adding further specifications to the overall concept (Chesterfield chairs, bulldogs, stepping) and more general concepts losing the common schematic picture and action schemata (furniture, pets, moving). This intermediate position – exactly like in the restaurant script example – makes basic level concepts good candidates *both* for holding large amounts of indeterminacy spots (which color, shape, age, etc. of the chair) *and* for holding aspects in readiness thanks to the detailed perception and action schemata associated with them (”he went among the furniture and sat down” permits us to imagine the typical bodily movement series and an average default chair associated with such an act, even if the latter has not been mentioned at all). The intermediate status of basic level concepts permits them to function ”both ways”, so to speak, probably in different combinations in different contexts – both as general schemata and as providers of relatively specific imaginations of objects and actions.

The examples highlighted here thus span from transcultural gestalts like container and source-path-goal over basic level concepts with their mixture of crosscultural (body parts, animals, mothers, eating, sleeping, walking, etc.) and culturally central objects and practices (cars, driving, teepees, houses) and to highly culturally specific schemata like the restaurant script. To the former category must be added narrative regularities like the Greimasian narratological molecule of Hero, Witch, King, Dragon, and Princess (more technically, Subject, Helper, Destinator, Anti-Subject, Object) which also seems to be transcultural and functioning as a cohering factor in large chunks of text, interconnecting the states of affairs of many sentences. Also here, very few actualized aspects of this basic schema easily and almost automatically permits the reader to fill-in the whole structure of the narrative conflict, its many aspects and different possibilities of development. To the latter category must be added whole ideologies and *Weltanschauungen*, Islam, Christianity, Communism, Capitalism, etc. etc. which form enormous, schematic complexes which may be actualized by very timid means (a sickle moon, a cross, the word "proletarian", "shareholder" etc.). Thus, the insight that the aim of filling-in of schematized aspects does not only involve sensuous schemata gives us an enormous amount of conceptual schematic structures held in readiness adding to the vitalization of the text during the reading process.

We shall not go further in this direction here, but a basic result seems to be that the somewhat crude duality between abstract and concrete in Ingarden's theory of concretization should probably be substituted by a continuous ladder of more and less abstract schemata (thus explaining the fact that many schemata may serve both as indeterminacy sources and as aspects-in-readiness sources).^{xv} The Austrian economist and philosopher Friedrich von Hayek who also was a philosopher of mind, has an interesting proposal in this context. His idea is that the whole of the mind's activity, all its variety and difference untold, has one common characteristic: categorization. The mind at all its levels involves categorization, of input on many levels of refinement, of output, of bodily dispositions, etc. – which implies that the contents of the mind, when they reach the threshold of consciousness, is always, at least to some extent, categorized. This he coins in the counterintuitive but highly interesting hypothesis of the "primacy of the abstract" which we also discussed in the biosemiotics section.^{xvi} Against the idea that perception is through-and-through concrete and that its possible abstract aspects or contents are added or distilled only by later, abstracting

processings of the primary, concrete content, Hayek claims that what appears before the mind is invariably infused with abstract – that is, schematic – structures. Thus, ordinary perception is *already* ripe with abstract aspects (also a Peircean idea)– we need not perform any complicated, secondary, founded act in order to isolate these. People we pass by on the street, e.g., appear to us schematic, we do not notice their exact dress, facial expression, walking style, etc. unless now and then one of them are saliently singled out for further concretization. Rather, the degree of concreteness in ordinary experience is highly variable and dependent on ongoing shifts in attention distribution.

This implies, in our context, that the concretization operations in literary reading becomes easier to understand. If ordinary perception is *already* to a large extent abstract and involves constant changes in concretization, the distance so to speak becomes less drastic (but still large enough to require concretization and filling-in operations) than was the case if perception was 100 percent sensuous, particular, and detailed.^{xvii}

But if these different schematic aspects of the text are indeed diagrammatical, in Peirce's sense of the word, then we should expect them to function as possible vehicles for diagram experiments. Indeed, in the previous chapter we developed the idea that, in reading or analyzing a text, the deductive reasoning phase implied more or less explicit cases of such experiments. In ordinary filling-in reading with its thematic focus on the level of represented objectivities, such experimenting is probably most evidently found in genres like detective novels, agent novels, thrillers, fairy-tales, fiction prose in general, where the experimenting with the possible outcomes of plot structures form a crucial part of the reading process – very often aided by the explicit diagram experimentation undertaken by a represented figure (a detective) which the reader may follow with awe or with the superiority of better insight provided by the narrator. This explicit, thematical case only forms, however, the tip of the iceberg: any case of deductive reasoning performed during the reading, thematically or unthematically, forms a diagram experiment in Peirce's sense. The relevance of such experiments adds further details to Ingarden's account for the filling-in procedure – it not only covers the dressing up schematic conceptual skeletons with imagined perceptual clothing, but it also covers a variety of logical inferences, thereby adding to the (quasi-) statements being explicitly represented in the literary work – on the basis of the schematic structures present in the work. Thus, the reader not only equips the work with much more sensuous illustrations than are explicitly present, he also develops the

work logically, by thought experimenting from its schematic basis. This becomes strikingly evident in the art of suspense where the reader may be able to infer to the existence of some vague threat not being explicitly referred to in the text, or where informations present in the text allow for the drawing of a conclusion which is not (yet?) available for characters in the represented world with their delimited point of view. But still, these explicit examples are only salient representatives of a process going on at a much broader scale.

A good example of literary diagram experiment is provided by *metaphor* which has been widely discussed in literary theory and cognitive science of the recent decades. Both the metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson and the related blending theory of Turner and Fauconnier highlight the fact that in such textual phenomena as metaphors and blending, schematic objects (structures mapped from source to target space in the former, "generic space" facilitating the integration of different inputs in a blend in the latter) play a central role. Metaphors thus also permit the duplicity of indeterminacy and holding-in-readiness – a source of indeterminacy relies in the fact that the text only rarely makes explicit the details of the mapping between source and target (and in some cases does not even make the target clear) – and a source for aspects held in readiness lies in the amount of semantic possibilities in the source concept which is *not* actualized in the given mapping, giving rise to the excess-of-meaning-experience so often associated with metaphor. As is evident from the theory of metaphors emerging from the cognitive semantics tradition, metaphor covers a continuum from basic, everyday expressions which most often pass unnoticed ("I see." as metaphor for "I understand." due to the metaphor UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING), and to sophisticated, elaborated or combined or nested cases in literary works. While the latter are processed automatically, not so in the more complicated cases. Already in rather simple cases, the understanding of metaphor requires thought experiments. Most metaphors, e.g., do not make explicit the range covered by the mapping involved, neither as regards the number of aspects of the source phenomenon to be mapped upon the target, nor as regards the possible generalization of the mapping to cover related phenomena. If my love is a rose, it goes without saying that the beauty and fragrance of the rose are among the aspects mapped, but what about the rose's verticality, its blooming during summer, or the fact that it thrives well on a diet of horse manure? And if the metaphor is accepted, is the possibility open that HUMAN BEINGS ARE FLOWERS in general, so that my love contrasts to other girls being petunias, tulips, thistles, and potatoes? Even a simple

metaphor as that mapping rose upon girl may involve such thought experiments of diagrammatical nature, and much more complicated metaphor craft most often require elaborate thought experiment in order to be understood. The understanding of all sufficiently complicated schematic structures in the literary text, both on the level of thema, narrative structures, enunciation, style and rhetoric requires diagram experiments. This highlights an aspect of the literary work of art which is underestimated in Ingarden's account: that of the literary work as a sort of thought-machine, requiring the reader to fill in inferences from the schematic structures in the text.^{xviii}

The most important implication of seeing Ingardenian schemata as diagrams, however, is the Peircean conception of generality as continuity. Indeterminate spots are *unbestimmt* all right, but Iser's renaming of them to *Leerstellen* is a rather unlucky terminological choice. Such spots are *not* empty but remain filled with continuous generality involving the knowledge that variation experiments *could* be undertaken to give them further flesh. The Peircean-Hayekian idea that ordinary perception is perfused with generality makes it less strange that general spots of indeterminacy easily shade into proto-perceptual experience – there is no absolute distinction between perceptual and poor schematicity, rather, the two approach each other on a continuous scale. This is also why the filling in of an indeterminacy spot in a diagram may be satisfied by *another*, more detailed diagram. We do not have to require filling-ins to be completely determinate; in many if not most cases a schematic filling-in is probably sufficient.

Realism, truth, and "ideas" in the literary work

Ingarden's monumental work is, as mentioned, intended as a support for his position in the idealism-realism schism which he saw develop between himself and his master Husserl. His solution based on the analysis of literature as fictitious texts led him to assume three major object spheres: that of real, that of ideal, and that of purely intentional objects, the former two being autonomous, the latter not so. This, as we have seen, also made him develop his own brand of Husserl's act theory.

A counter-question must here be posted: literature now functions as the contrast case to acts aiming at real or ideal objects, as the phenomenon which thanks to its fictivity permits the discovery of the region of purely intentional objects – but does it not thereby make literature so to speak *more* fictive than necessary?^{xix} Where does it leave the common notions of literary "realism", the idea of a "truth" in the literary work, etc.? Ingarden closes his

book by pondering over these issues, Of course, the very definition of the literary work of art by quasi-judgments precludes the possibility that the work should in any sense contain a true judgment in the proper sense (and the idea that this might be the case may have been more widespread when Ingarden wrote *Das literarische Kunstwerk*; nowadays it is an error rarely committed.) Still, there are three more loose senses of the word "true" in which a literary work could be said to be true, as Ingarden claims. One is its function as reproduction (do the represented objectivities resemble certain real objectivities which they intend?), one refers to the work's "objective consistency" (Do its represented objectivities cohere?), and one refers to the manifestation of the already discussed "metaphysical qualities" (the latter are also Ingarden's interpretation of the commonplace of the "idea" of the literary work of art).

These ideas require some comments. The first idea of the truth of the work, that of resembling reproduction, is placed by Ingarden as relevant only for historical novels, that is, for a very small part of literary works in general. But why reserve this notion of truth for the resemblance to a given empirical segment of the world? This truth may be generalized to covering also *types* of objectivities – does the work, e.g., satisfactorily recreate tendencies, structures, atmospheres of a given age? Such types range, in themselves, from clear to vague, and some of them may be close to Ingarden's metaphysical qualities, but it cannot possibly be the case that all attempts at describing central structures of a country during a period possess the existentialist insistence of "metaphysical qualities". This idea of truth is similar to the superficial idea of realism or iconicity in French structuralism and post-structuralism, e.g. in Greimas and Barthes who differ in many respects but whose accounts for "reality effects" have much in common: it refers to the text's surface and its make-believe by means of typical reality-references, superimposed on top of more important layers of the text, be they structuralist semantics or streaming textual pleasure. Ingarden's account does not have the derogatory character of these French anti-realists, but still this kind of truth plays a (too) marginal role also in his account. To take a trivial example, what about key novels where main characters may be more or less reliably identified with really existing persons – this may not be a "reality effect" only, but rather constitutes a central intention and issue of such works. Or take "typical" realism as discussed in the Lukacsian tradition – novels aiming to representing central laws and regularities of the periods or societies depicted. Neither in this case such realism is a reality effect only, but a relation whose degree of truthfulness may be reasonably discussed –

even if still, of course, on the typical level and not on that of more concrete empirical reality.

The second idea of literary truth: consistency, implies some problems not discussed by Ingarden. Taken at face value, consistency is an internal concept (cf. consistency truth theories in philosophy), and Ingarden's first description does indeed have this character: "... once represented objectivities are established by meaning contents of sentences as objects of a determined ontic type (e.g., as real objects and, in particular, as real psychic individuals), a consistency must be maintained in their further determination if they are to be constituted in the over-all course of the work as identical ..." (302). This internal consistency idea, however, is mixed up with what is, in fact, quite another idea: conformity to regional ontological structures: "This consistency, however, can be maintained only if the content of represented objects is formed, at the very least, according to the a priori essential laws of a given ontic region." (ibid.). Surely, the first idea also referred to "objects of a determined ontic type", but earlier in the book Ingarden took care to note that it belongs to the privileges of the literary work to *mix* regional ontological domains to create improbable and impossible creatures. Such creatures, when first created, must also maintain an ontic stability – so they are permitted by the first, internalist consistency criterion, but prohibited by the latter, externalist consistency criterion. As a matter of fact, there is no contradiction here; the case is probably that Ingarden in his very short chapter confuses what is, in fact, two autonomous and equally valuable truth notions of the literary work, the former judging the coherence of the objectivity level represented, the latter judging the work's adherence to the a priori essence laws of a given regional ontology.^{xx} A further issue here deals with the question where to delimit this latter kind of literary truth – regional ontology – from the latter of the two "effect of reality" truths above. Of course, typical expressions of a location, an age, etc. are empirical generalities only and thus differ from regional ontological essences (like person, mind, will, etc.). But the difference may be very difficult to tell – both in the single literary work which may easily mix up empirical and a priori issues, but also in philosophy and science where the precise amount of a priori regularities in single domains is far from mapped out. Probably the understanding of the different a priori structures of reality is as indefinite as that of empirical facts – cf. "fallibilistic apriorism" discussed earlier. So even if the distinction between empirical and apriorical may be easily maintained in theory, the precise delimitation is blurred and different literary works may present their competing versions to be compared.

Finally, there is the "noblest" of Ingarden's truth criteria, that of the "metaphysical qualities". This requires the mysterious manifestation of such qualities which – just like is the case with their real life appearance – has the unconditional form of revelation. Either they are there, or they are not there. This should not, however, prevent us from trying to indicate their status in the cases when they do in fact appear. In Ingarden's definition, they all pertain to the lived world of intersubjective human existence – and we may, again, ask for the precise delimitation of these qualities and regularities pertaining to the regional ontologies relevant for man. Husserl never developed in detail his doctrine of regional ontologies (apart from his crude distinction between those of physics, psychology and sociology, approximately), and even if a Stumpfo-Husserlian like Barry Smith's vision of a large series of more and less fine-grained regional ontologies remains provisional, realist phenomenological ontology must maintain that all empirical phenomena are governed by regional ontologies. This also goes for intersubjectivist, existential reality of the kind Ingarden speaks about when outlining his doctrine of "metaphysical qualities". Is the literary manifestation of such qualities a provisional grasping of them, until a proper regional ontology is developed for their understanding – or, the opposite way around, is literature perhaps a unique and appropriate way of grasping these core phenomena of human reality? Or, a compromise, are both ways parallel and equally valid ways of exploring human reality? Until further notice, I prefer to believe the latter.

To sum up, the discussion of truth and realism in literature leaves us with no less than five different notions^{xxi}:

Literary pseudo-truths

- 1) *truth as empirical resemblance*
- 2) *truth as typical resemblance*
- 3) *truth as internal consistency*
- 4) *truth as external (ontological) consistency*
- 5) *truth as manifestation of metaphysical qualities*

Even if an Ingardenian literary theory must be basically a theory of fiction, it thus may give rise to a rich palette of iconic ways in which literature interferes with reality^{xxii}. The two former types refers to iconic relations to empirical reality; the third to an internal iconicity in the text (that figures and entities in the text remain sufficiently similar over the development of the text), the fourth pertains to iconicity in relation to regional ontologies, and

the fifth iconicity in relation to metaphysical qualities as experienced in real life.

In the next chapter we shall look into how a subgenre constitutes itself on the basis on the fourth type, conformity to a material ontology – that of political science and, particularly, espionage.

ⁱ Ingarden's whole œuvre thus forms a late flower of what is often called "Göttingen" phenomenology from the period when Husserl lectured there. Among Ingarden's other chief influences thus count other early realist phenomenologists from the Göttingen circle or the München phenomenologists they were associated with: Adolf Reinach, Alexander Pfänder, Alexius Meinong, Johannes Daubert, etc.

ⁱⁱ "Idealism" here to be taken in the sense of the construal of the real world by the subject – not in the sense of claiming the real existence of ideal objects; in the former sense, Ingarden is an anti-idealist, in the latter, he – just like other phenomenologists, including Peirce – is an idealist. This turn has been the object of much discussion, ranging from the assertion that it took place somewhere between *Logische Untersuchungen* (1901) and *Ideen* (1913), with 1906-07 as peak candidate, to the claim that it never took place and that the internal continuity in Husserl's work remains far greater than the discontinuities. Ingarden was Husserl's pupil from around 1912-18 and obviously in this period found Husserl's philosophy as well as his teaching basically realist (in concert with the other Göttingen pupils), and he claims the internal tensions between realism and idealism in Husserl's thought only tipped to the side of idealism in the early twenties, only to be made public as late as in *Cartesiansche Meditationen* and *Formale und transcendente Logik*. In any case, Ingarden's experience of such a turn was what prompted his early publications "Essentielle Fragen" (1925) and "Bemerkungen zum Problem "Idealismus-Realismus" (1929) as well as *Das literarische Kunstwerk*. Indeed, Ingarden's enormous *Der Streit* (1965-74) forms the late culmination of this *Auseinandersetzung*. In Ingarden's letters to Husserl, the issue is discussed openly in detail (Husserl 1968).

ⁱⁱⁱ *Vom Erkennen* and *Der Streit* are preceded by Polish versions (from 1937 and 1947-48 and 1960-61, respectively). As I do not read Polish and as the German versions are Ingarden's own, revised, translations, I stick to them and the corresponding English translations.

^{iv} In the Austrian tradition, the notion of *Sachverhalte* often has this duplicity or ambiguity: referring both to the content of propositions, on the one hand, and to the objectivity referred to by those propositions, on the other.

^v As always in the phenomenological tradition, "object" here does not merely refer to physical things, but includes everything "regardless of objectivity category and material essence. Thus it refers to things as well as persons, but also to all possible occurrences, states, acts performed by persons, etc." (219)

^{vi} Thus, the beloved ambiguity and paradox of New Criticism, as well as the self-contradiction revered by deconstruction, are already grasped by Ingarden's theory – albeit not as indispensable properties of the literary work, but rather as possibilities among others.

^{vii} Ingarden gives a reference to Pfänder for the notion of "quasi-judgment": Pfänder's distinction between two functions of the copula; assertive and predicative, respectively. Furthermore, the two extremes between which the *quasi* is localised are described with reference to Russell (the assertive judgment) and Husserl (neutrality modification), respectively (176). We may add that the very terminology (and the basic idea) also comes from Husserl (cf. ch. 15) who uses "quasi" intensely in the 1910's when Ingarden studied by him in Göttingen.

^{viii} In *Logik der Dichtung*, Käte Hamburger protests against the definition of the literary work by quasi-judgments. Quasi-judgments possess no special formal characteristics making it possible to isolate them – and Hamburger is on the search for such formal linguistic criteria (as the ”erlebte Rede” (style indirect libre), the historical present tense, and, especially, the epic past tense ”Tomorrow it was the first day ...”). Hamburger’s valuable work on these forms notwithstanding, they still do not constitute formal criteria of fiction – they are neither necessary nor sufficient, for there are many fictive works without any of these forms. So her use of these forms as weapon against Ingarden does not work – her argument that Ingarden’s idea is circular because it only says a judgment is a quasi-judgment because it appears in a novel would hit herself to the same degree if we were to take her formal studies as definitory for literariness or fiction. Maybe a misunderstanding is at stake here – Ingarden does not claim that what he finds is not circular, it is no attempt at *defining* the literary work by means of properties in its constituents, it is rather a description of the status of those constituents.

^{ix} Ingarden’s dwelling with these metaphors indirectly refers to his idealism-realism agenda and his ongoing discussion with and of Husserl’s gradual turn to idealism. Ingarden regards *Ideen* as ambiguous as regards idealism. The idealism-realism issue had not explicitly been the object of Husserl’s published writings until the *Ideen*, and Husserl’s Göttingen students obviously assumed – according to Ingarden – *Logische Untersuchungen* – to be realist. They were thus surprised to see the much more explicitly idealist *Ideen I*, especially because Husserl’s lectures was in a ”... wenn man so sagen darf, realistischen Ton gehalten.” (Ingarden 1998 (1968), p. 407) – thus Husserl’s lectures at the same time (summer semester 1913) on ”Natur und Geist” – being close to the more realist approach of the *Ideen II*. (ibid.)

In the *Ideen I*, on the one hand, the claim is repeated that the object is ”transcendent” in relation to the act, and the epistemology for ideal objects is not, unlike that of real objects, revised in the *Ideen*, so that Husserl still appears as a realist in these respects. On the other hand, the whole noesis-noema doctrine of the act is seen by Ingarden as idealist, reducing the object world of space-time to: ”... ein Sein, das das Bewußtsein in seine Erfahrungen setzt, das prinzipiell nur als Identisches von motivierten Erscheinungsmannigfaltigkeiten anschaulich und bestimmbar – *darüber hinaus* aber ein Nichts ist.” (*Ideen I*, p. 93, quoted in Ingarden 1998, p. 211 (1956)) – a quote to which Ingarden returns.

This criticism of Husserl’s position is constant in Ingarden’s many writings about the subject. He writes – as early as in his 1918 letter to Husserl about the re-edition of the VI. investigation -: ”Wir kommen am Ende zu der Gleichung: Ding = ein eigentümlich gebautes Noema-Bewußtsein.” (Ingarden 1998, p. 5). So the relation between the single aspects-noemas and the thing-noema constituted by them is what recurs in Ingarden’s idea of the states of affairs forming a ”net” around the represented objectivity which thus to some extent corresponds to the noema. Unlike Husserl’s noema, this objectivity is, of course, distinct from the correlated real or ideal object itself (if it exists).

^x Here, an important difference in relation to Peirce’s metaphysics resides in the fact that Peirce would never allow particulars of any sort to be completely determined, inter alia because of the indeterminacy of their future states. To Peirce, thus, there are *real*

Unbestimmtheitsstellen mirroring the case of semiotic representations. Indeterminacy, in any case, must be far more extensive in representations.

^{xi} Wellek says (1991, p. 379): "I find myself in wide agreement with his views and acknowledge learning from him, on many of these questions, more than from anybody else." – and still "I find it difficult to isolate this stratum of schematic aspects from that of represented objects ..." (383). The polemical dialogue between the two is recorded in later editions of *Das literarische Kunstwerk* and in Wellek 1991.

^{xii} "All so-called sensory qualities – but not only these - are self-presenting" (196) Just like categorial entities in Husserl may also permit intuitive access, it is not only sensory qualities which satisfy self-presentation. We saw that occurrence states also did it to some extent (due to what – due to the schematic character of their event type?) – and we must assume that (certain simple?) ideal objects also display self-presentation (cf. ch. 6). This becomes important for the stratum of schematized aspects.

^{xiii} Ingarden's account for these qualities has hardly left the first, descriptive phase. It is evident that reading great literature, qualities like the mentioned are often experienced, but their status does not seem perfectly clear in Ingarden's theory. They seem to be objective qualities dependent on temporal situations depicted in the object level – but why is it that they are presented as extraordinary, almost quasi-religious breaks with everyday life (cf. the word "revelation" used as common denominator for them)? It is true that literature often describes such qualities, but literature also has the power of redescribing aspects of everyday life with an intensity which may make us experience it as with new eyes. So their "revelation" character ought to be described more meticulously in order to avoid identifying them rightaway with vitalist ecstasies or intensities. Recall, for a corrective point of view, that the doctrine of Russian formalism with its avant garde aesthetics applauded "deviation" exactly for its potential for making us see the trivial things anew – to see again the stoneness of the stone, etc. If constructed properly, Ingarden's "metaphysical qualities" should include this sort of aesthetic experience as well, far from the vitalist shocks seeming to play center stage (in his examples, at least). What about the boring, the sick, the tedious, the ordinary, the vexatious, the brooding, the slowly threatening, the contingent ... it takes a true master to make such metaphysical qualities appear with the same intensity as Ingarden's more vitalist examples.

^{xiv} I owe many insights in these paragraphs to my discussions with Thomas Illum Hansen who also works with the ideas of integrating cognitive semantics insights into an Ingardenian framework (Hansen 2001; 2004).

^{xv} This would also throw new light on Ingarden's attempt at distinguishing the literary work of art from the scientific literary work. Of course his principal distinction goes between literary quasi-judgments and scientific judgments – where the latter serve the depiction of transcendent (real or ideal) objects. More debateable is his idea that in a scientific work one must focus upon the objects represented solely, and that the "... situation of the aspects which may be held in readiness in a scientific work is analogous, unless the aspects perform a particular cognitive role in the work." (1968, 157). The addition is significant, for in the scientific work, the aspects held in readiness may perform a *cognitive* role akin to the aesthetic role played in the literary work – in both cases the function of making the objects represented *intuitive* unites the role of the

aspects. Diagrams may directly play the role of such aspects. While we agree with Ingarden in the basic distinction (against all sorts of deconstructivism blurring fiction and reality), we find a greater degree of relatedness between the two.

^{xvi} Cf. Hayek 1978.

^{xvii} With respect to this, a myth probably exists in phenomenology about the definite concreteness of what is perceptually given. But the concreteness of ordinary perceptual experience does not lie in it being constantly highly detailed, but rather in the fact that we know that we could always, in a given situation, choose to focus more attentively on this or that feature and thus bring forth further detail – which is not possible, of course, in purely textually or diagrammatically presented objectivities.

^{xviii} This does not, however, imply that literary quality necessarily lies in the making explicit and thematic such thought experiments in themselves. As Hansen (2004) argues, Iser's idea that the reader's explicit grasping of literary conventions and machinery involved therein constitutes the access to complicated literature and its aesthetic values, is wrong. The diagram experiments here discussed are undertaken primarily in order to co-constitute the level of represented objectivities, not to abstract from it and seeking the work's *raison-d'être* only in its ingenious use of literary devices.

^{xix} What about literary genres like poetry or essays, do they share the basic definition by quasi-judgments? Another of Ingarden's famous opponents, Käte Hamburger, has a counterargument along these lines. She famously claims that poetry is emphatically *not* fictive, but rather a special genre, to be classified along with the "Ich-Erzählung", the 'I-tale', referring to the subjective experience reality of the lyrical ego. We shall not go into this discussion here, but Hamburger is obviously right that it seems questionable to define the notoriously fuzzy concept of literature as a whole on the basis of fictivity. Rutkowski 1978 291-92 details this argument: poetry may be fictive or not, just like epic literature (containing both adventure novels and autobiographies). Similarly, other counterexamples can be listed: fictional texts which are not literature (myth; scientific or other thought experiments). So most likely, it is not the case that literature and fictionality is coextensional, and Ingarden's theory does not hold for the whole wide field covered by the umbrella concept of literature but only for that large prototypical subset of it which develops fictive universes.

^{xx} A further point to be discussed is *formal* ontology. Ingarden mentions the idea in a short note (p. 302) and says that as long as a literary work deals with *objects* at all, the laws of formal ontology must be observed. Given the broad phenomenological idea of objects (covering events, states, processes, qualities, being ideal, real, intentional; physical, psychic etc.) it may be more difficult than expected to transgress formal ontology, so assumably, there is hardly any specific literary truth effect connected to adherence to formal ontology.

^{xxi} This taxonomy of iconicities in literature does not prevent further, indirect iconicities to play a role in the literary work which are orthogonal to the types here mentioned and may freely combine with all of them: That of experienced events being seen through a narrator or a character; that of an indirect, symbolical or allegorical reference; that of adding illustrations (maps, graphs, diagrams, etc.) to the text or directly shape the text after such icons as in figure poems, etc.

^{xxii} Maybe these types of truth could ease the tension between Ingarden and Hamburger. The latter attacks fiction theories of literature with reference to the non-fictionality of poetry and first-person narration (and a related case could be made for the literary essay) – but even if “quasi-judgments” are basically fiction, the two concepts are not completely coextensive. Quasi-judgments come in many types (they form a continuum between assertion and mere predication or assumption) and the most assertion-like quasi-judgments, so to speak, only marginally differ from full-fledged assertions. The personal truths experienced in poetry reading or the journalistic or philosophical truth in essayism could thus be seen as a mixture of assertion-like quasi-judgments with pseudo-truths of the types here listed.

To return to the discussion of interpretation in chapter 16, Ingarden’s doctrine may also permit us to distinguish between the often mixed-up notions of reading, analysis and interpretation. Reading is prototypically Ingardenian concretization – it is the appropriation of the work which performs the different procedures of filling-in and of actualization of schematized aspects held-in-readiness. Analysis, then, is the operation which – typically on the basis of a reading – attempts to get an overview of the text’s organic structure, which parts relate to what other parts in which way. Analysis, then, makes explicit a lot of things unthematically participating in reading – at the same time as it is, typically, ascetic regarding the filling-in which is artificially kept back. Interpretation, finally, is the appropriation of the text which is primarily aimed at the pseudo-truth of the work – in some or all of the five senses here mentioned. As is evident, many empirical examples of papers about specific literary texts indulge in combinations of all three procedures; probably the prototypical academic, informed treatment of literary texts will do so.