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The Representation of Consciousness in Language and Fiction

A Cognitive Theory of Enunciation

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There is an old connection between linguistics and literary theory which is strong in currents like structuralism and phenomenology but which has tended to be severed during periods of scepticist literary theory. The ongoing school of "cognitive semantics" and "cognitive linguistics" is no doubt among the most important development in semiotics during recent decades, and this current has, to a large degree, taken up again the old Jakobsonian connection between language and literature, most conspicuously in their theories of metaphor and blending. Far less interest has been paid, for some strange reason, to the issue of "enunciation" – covering the different linguistic and literary devices for connecting the speaking subject with his speech. In this paper, we shall review the enunciative aspects of the cognitive turn and make some proposals for their further development.

A general idea in cognitive semantics, of course, is that linguistic structures are not arbitrary with respect to the general cognitive apparatus, but, quite on the contrary, motivated, to a large extent, by cognitive functions. The same basic idea must lie behind a cognitive theory of enunciation. The traditional linguistic devices in enunciation – deixis, time and space adverbs, pronouns, tense, aspect, intention and speech act verbs, anaphora, etc. – do not form an arbitrary set of linguistic conventions but are highly motivated by the very purpose of enunciation: to connect the content and aim of speech with the speaker's consciousness, and to make possible the representation of other consciousnesses at a distance in time, space, modus, or person.

What is enunciation?

In the most common and frequent usage, the English word *enunciation* means *to pronounce words, especially carefully and clearly*. And only secondarily, it refers to the meaning relevant in this context, namely: *the relation between statements and their generating instance*. In French, the opposite relation holds, and the idea of enunciation as an important structuring device in language is so widespread in French linguistics that it is mostly referred to in the definite as *l'énonciation*, the originator of the technical use of "énonciation" as opposed to "énoncé" being the linguist Emile Benveniste. It is hard to say whether it is due to this lack of a similar conventional "strong word" in English, but the fact is that in the Anglo-American scholarly tradition, including cognitive semantics and cognitive linguistics, enunciation does not to the same degree constitute a well-defined field of research. No doubt, a lot of important work on the subject has been done in English, but then under different names such as "narratology", "discourse analysis", "rhetoric of fiction", "representation of consciousness in fiction", etc.

Approaching enunciation as a semiotic problem, the task at hand is to explain how different language-signs can code for different relations between statement and generating instance. A simple example is the following:

- a) I like him
- b) I liked him

– where in a), the present tense morpheme, -Ø, means that the state referred to is co-temporal with the generating instance, while the past-tense morpheme in b), -(e)d, means that the state is displaced in relation to the generating instance. Thus, the grammatical category of tense is a central device in an enunciation context. Other linguistic categories that are normally discussed in relation to enunciation are aspect, modality, intention and speech act verbs, time-and-place adverbs, anaphora, deixis.

Zooming in on some core problems pertaining to the phenomenon at hand, we start by noting that enunciation has to do with a *subjective* aspect of language. Except for marginal cases, utterances are made by conscious human beings, and thus one thing that unites all existing theories on enunciation is the attempt at linking linguistics and subjectivity. However, the way in which the concept of "the subjective" is understood may have great influence on how one constructs a theory of enunciation, and one central claim we wish to make in this paper is that an informed concept of *consciousness* and its representation may improve the theory of enunciation. Enunciation should, in its basic form, be understood as a relation between statements and their generating *consciousness*, and the reason cognitive linguistics may be taken as a possible lever for enunciation theory is that 1) its main interest is aspects of that very relation, and 2) certain traditions within cognitive linguistics can help us to the informed concept of consciousness. Thus, in this article we will try to "dig out" what has actually been done on enunciation in cognitive linguistics, regardless of the fact already mentioned namely that the word "enunciation" is not *en vogue* in that current. We will show that in cognitive linguistics, an outline of a cognitive theory of enunciation can be found, and we will develop these ideas further by developing this outline to cover some interesting and complex cases of enunciative structure in verbal art.

However, before we turn to cognitive linguistics, we should mention two more characteristic traits of the general field of enunciation research, the first one being an almost exclusive reference to fiction rather than "normal" conversational language.ⁱ Work on enunciation is most often work on the relations between narrators and narrated characters in novels or short stories, probably for the basic reason that in fictive texts, complicated enunciation issues has a striking and obvious relevance.

The second trait concerns an important variation within the field. On the one hand there is a long tradition in fiction studies for discussing the existence or non-existence of a unique "fictional discourse" characterized by a unique enunciation structure. Most famously, the German literary scholar Käte Hamburger builds her theory of epic fiction on the idea that in the prototypical third-person, past tense fiction, the enunciation structure is unique in that the past tense does not signify past time, but rather fictional status. She finds evidence for this in the fact that a prototypical feature of fictional discourse is that adverbs with present time sphere reference ("now") or future time sphere reference ("tomorrow", "tonight", "in a while" etc.) modify past tense, while the same feature is rare in "normal" conversational language. "Epische Präteritum" she calls the phenomenon (epic past tense), and we may illustrate it here with an example from the novel *Marie Grubbe* by the Danish author J.P. Jacobsen:

Marie turned. Her aunt's maid, Lucie, had for some time been sitting on the table appraising her own well-formed feet with critical eyes. Tired of this occupation, she had called out and now sat swinging her legs and laughing merrily. (Jacobsen, p. 18).

Here, the adverb "now" modifies a verb, namely "to sit", in the past tense.

According to Hamburger this highly interesting and peculiar linguistic phenomenon is due to lack of any *real* consciousness behind the fictional discourse.ⁱⁱ

The fictional status signified by the epic preterite involves a cancellation of the generating instance, and thus a reducing of the "enunciation equation" to the very statement alone – without any generating instance. In the words of Hamburger, the epic past tense

... seine Vergangenheitsfunktionen verliert und dies seine Ursache darin hat, dass die Zeit der epischen Handlung, d.h. aber diese selbst, nicht auf eine reale Ich-Origo, ein "redendes" oder Aussagesubjekt bezogen ist, sondern auf die fiktiven Ich-Origines der Romangestalten. (Hamburger 1957, p. 39).

The idea of a unique fictional discourse constituted by a lack of a real generating instance has its French parallel in Emile Benveniste's distinction between 'normal' spoken language, *le discours*, and a special narrative language, *l'histoire*, marked by the French past tense form *aorist*. And we understand how scholars in the Benveniste and Hamburger tradition may speak of novels "telling themselves": there is no real "origo" to do the telling.

Since Hamburger published her hypothesis in her 1957 classic *Die Logik der Dichtung*, it has been criticized from various sides, and today it has become rarer to subscribe to the idea of a certain linguistic form as constitutive of fiction. An important critic is Franz Stanzel who argued, in 1959, that sentences with "now" or "future" adverbial modification of past tense is only possible in contexts of so-called *style indirect libre* (the free indirect style), i.e. contexts where the narrator of the fiction empathises with his character to the degree where his language gets influenced by idioms from the latter. In the Jacobsen example mentioned above, Stanzel would no doubt have called attention to the passage just before the one quoted:

On a Sunday morning early in September, Marie Grubbe stood looking out of the dormer window in Mistress Rigitze's house. Not a vehicle in sight! Nothing but staid footsteps, and now and then the long drawn cry of the oystermonger. The sunlight quivering over roofs and pavements, threw sharp, black, almost rectangular shadows. The distance swam in a faint bluish heat mist. (Jacobsen, p. 18).

Here, it is evident that we are experiencing the scene through the eyes of Marie Grubbe, and the verb-less sentence, "Not a vehicle in sight", belongs to her thoughts rather than to a narrator: the exclamation is due to her judgment about her surroundings. And this enunciation structure could be said to continue in the next passage where we have the Hamburger modification of the past tense with "now": we are still experiencing events through the consciousness of Marie Grubbe, and the adverb has *her* actual experience as at its immediate point of reference. But as Stanzel demonstrates in his article, there may be fiction passages where empathy is absent, and here, a word like "now" can not have a fictional character as its point of reference but rather refers to a the reference point of a narrator which can not, then, be non-existent.

Given such observations, Stanzel gives up the idea of a strict linguistic definition of fiction. Instead he tries to develop a typology of different narrative enunciation types, i.e. various ways in which a generating instance can be related to what is talked about, giving rise to his famous narrative circle.ⁱⁱⁱ A story may be told in different ways – by a third person narrator, a first person narrator, in the past tense, in the present tense, in free indirect speech or thought, directly narrated etc. – and Stanzel tries to account for these ways on their own level, so to be speak, treating the linguistic constitution of the various forms on an *ad hoc*-basis. Comparable approaches are the influential works of Gerard Genette and Wayne C. Booth in France and the US,

respectively.

Cognitive linguists on enunciation I: Talmy and the varieties of the point of view category

With the rough sketch given above, we showed how different theories stress different parts of the "enunciation equation". Either there is a wish to make a "strong" linguistic claim of unique enunciation structures in fiction, or there is a more "free" discussion of literary enunciation types. What cognitive linguistics offers is a theory of language that has as one of its central interests the relation between language-signs and generating conscious instance. Thus, it seems naturally suited as a starting point for an investigation with equal focus on both the linguistic and the literary sides of the mentioned "equation".

Cognitive linguistics stresses the existence of a motivated link between structural components and semantic components in language, and most importantly: The need of these links and relations to be grasped and explained on a more global level – a level prelinguistic and cognitive - than a mere formal or generative approach will allow for.^{IV}

A milestone in the development of realising the cognitive project is found in Leonard Talmy's *Towards a Cognitive Semantics*, and the first and last chapter of this two volume work, namely "The Relation of Grammar to Cognition" and "A Cognitive Framework for Narrative Structure" are of specific interest to an investigation of enunciation.

Let us look at Talmy's first chapter. Here, his point of departure is the well-known distinction between closed- and open-class semantics, previously discussed by linguists such as Sapir, Whorf, and Jakobson. Talmy's predecessors described how open-classes specify material concepts while closed-classes specify a formal framework of relational concepts, but Talmy tries to dig deeper with a focus on the cognitive motivation of grammar and an aim to determine "the semantic and cognitive properties and functions of this structural component of language as a whole.", (p. 22).

According to Talmy, the concepts specified by grammar form a pattern in "extensive integrated concept structuring systems", (p. 40). He calls them "schematic systems" and gives an account for primarily three such systems: *configurational structure*, *perspective*, and *distribution of attention* (and he adds force dynamics and cognitive state as further systems to consider).

Configurational structure deals with "the schematic structuring or geometric delineations in space or time or other qualitative domains that closed class forms can specify", (p. 47), that is for example whether an entity is uniplex, consisting of one element only, or multiplex, consisting of more elements (normally specified by the presence or absence of a plurality marker, in English: -s). Another category is degree of extension (boundedness), where a grammatical form such as aspect can determine whether an action is conceptualized as punctual or extended (she climbed the ladder / she was climbing the ladder).

With the next two schematic systems, perspective and distribution of attention, we move from the inherent structure of entities and actions to the question of how these entities and actions are perceived by a grammatically defined cognitive agent built into the sentence. We are dealing with the relation between an addresser and an addressee on the one side and the matters spoken about, the message, on the other; in other words: with enunciation.

Perspective establishes "a conceptual perspective point from which the entity is cognitively regarded" (p. 68), while distribution of attention "consists of various patterns of different strengths with which one's attention is directed over a referent

object or scene" (p. 76). Of course, a point of view automatically involves a distributed attention, the reason being that a point of view is not a purely linguistic entity, but rather a conceptualization of a conscious agent experiencing a scene from somewhere – and conscious agents of course have attention patterns. In the category of perspectival mode, Talmy distinguishes e.g. "a stationary distal perspective" from a "moving proximal perspective" the former involving a "global scope of attention", the latter involving a "local scope of attention" (p. 70). The following example from Talmy demonstrates relation between the two (p. 71):

- a. There are some houses in the valley, (stationary, global).
- b. There is a house every now and then through the valley, (moving, local).

Talmy explains that the configurational system "encompasses most aspects of the schemas specified by spatial or temporal adpositions, subordinating conjunctions, deixis, aspect/tense markers, number markers, and the like", but these grammatical categories are also involved in specifying point of view, deixis^v being the most obvious example besides the aspect and tense markers. The same grammatical categories thus support the linguistic structuring of the basic cognitive systems. Perspective and attention – two central aspects of enunciation – thus form two interdependent schematic systems, which are, to a large degree, grammaticalized. Thus, the relation between the basic cognitive systems – presumably human universals – on the one hand, and the linguistic structure appearing in closed-class systems is double. Seen from the point of view of cognition, linguistic and grammatical structure of a language are motivated by cognitive tasks, and such structures combine the basic functions of cognitive systems in different ways in different languages – what is grammaticalized in one language may be performed by lexical, semantic means in another. Seen from the point of view of grammar, the grammatical system of a language forms semi-autonomous surface structure combining in a specific way functional demands from a more general, basic substructure of cognitive systems. Thus, Talmy's analytical categories add to our understanding of the relationship between linguistics and cognition, between language and consciousness, because they articulate our understanding of language in terms of basic cognitive capabilities.^{vi}

With respect to the issues of point of view and of enunciation, Talmy takes the discussion a step further in his large chapter on narratology, basing the discussion on his basic schematic systems. It should immediately be said that Talmy in that chapter takes the term narratology in a very broad sense, covering not only enunciation proper, but also temporal sequence, plot structure, coherence, cultural embeddedness, etc.

Naturally, the central enunciative points come in the discussion of perspective and attention. The relation author – addressee is articulated in points transgressing the normal communication model, because:

... the author must orchestrate the selection, sequencing, and pacing of material in a way that is likely to cause the desired effects, given his understanding of the addressee's psychology. (430)

so as to engender suspense, surprise, interest, hurt, fear, joy etc. in the reader which the author does not necessarily feel himself. Talmy does not, it is true, draw the basic narratological distinction between the biographical author and the narrator (Booth's "implied author"), but he is perfectly right on two basic issues: 1) the need for the assumption of an organizing position distributing the narrative material in order for the text to be grasped as one work and not a scattered heap of text bits and 2) the existence

of an implied reader given by the assumptions of reader psychology, cognitive capability and knowledge horizon inherent in the text. A major tool in the hands of the narrator in his setting the scene for the addressee is, of course, the distribution of points of view in the text, in Talmy "perspective point". Talmy's foundational paper does not go into analytical detail, but he outlines some important ideas for further research: the idea that

... some assessing faculty of some sentient entity is situated at the location understood as a perspective point. This assessing faculty is typically a perceptual system, especially that of vision, but can also comprise a 'sentient entity' of beliefs and opinions, among various possibilities. (440)

The crucial observation here is that there is a very wide variety as to what may function as a point of view in a text, ranging from a perspective closely tied to perception and to perspectives also, or maybe primarily, constituted by beliefs and opinions – thoughts, emotions, passions, memories, fantasies, calculations, ideologies, world views, or any possible combination of possible intention types, we may add. We shall return to this idea later in the paper.

Similarly, Talmy widens the perspective in another dimension when he observes that the metaphor of a "point" of view might mislead us, exactly because the analogy with one located perceptual system may not always hold:

In principle, it might be a region, or indeed a set of points and regions. (441)

A last generalizing observation by Talmy regards the supposed agent responsible for the viewpoint; here, Talmy distinguishes the prototypical case of an individuated psychological agent from various forms of social groups able to act in an intentional way. This sociological observation forms, so to speak, a cool version of a concept of system consciousness inherited from German idealism – social organizations of many sorts are able to function sociologically as the agents of a viewpoint. Talmy lists social groups or institutions (gender, race ethnic group, class, nation (444)), and we may add states, organizations, ideologies, etc.); such institutions may be taken, more or less rightfully, to embody points of views in analogy to individual consciousnesses. In a basic sense, of course, the ascription of a point of view to such entities which are not conscious relies on a metaphor – but it is a metaphor incarnated and effective in the real fabric of social life. Finally, Talmy adds the vague but uncontested notion of "atmosphere": the ascription in real life or text of consciousness or intention states to particular environments, regions, periods, or events. (445)

While the prototypical molecule of enunciation may be said to be one speaker and his statement, Talmy makes an important point in encouraging us to investigate the possible extension of the category by the eidetic variation of that everyday and basic enunciation molecule into possible further directions.^{vii}

But while Talmy thus, in this basic sketch of a whole bouquet of narratological issues, points to some very important generalizations of the notion of perspective point to be pursued, he does not go far into the structure of basic intentions in the represented consciousness of perspective points. This road is taken, however, by Wallace Chafe.

Cognitive linguists on enunciation, II: Chafe and the issue of representing consciousness

Chafe's major contribution to enunciation theory (*Discourse, Consciousness, and Time*

which again does not actually use the notion of "enunciation") begins with a thorough account of different aspects of consciousness. Most important in our context is the ability of displacement: consciousness may focus on things happening "here and now", but it may also focus on something *not* here and now, i.e. something which is displaced in time and space. Chafe distinguishes the two as extroverted consciousness (perceiving, acting on or evaluating on the "here and now") versus introverted consciousness (focusing on purely mental objects, namely past remembered, future anticipated, or figments imagined).^{viii}

Chafe now asks the following basic question: how is this difference between extroversion and introversion represented in language? On the basis of sequences of spoken language tape-recorded at casual dinner parties, he finds three linguistic parameters in which extroversion and introversion consistently differ: *detail*, *continuity* and *deixis*. Let us begin with the category *detail* by looking at the matter in purely phenomenological terms. A general rule seems to be that for the extroverted consciousness there is an availability of a potentially infinite number of details present in perception, while this is not the case for the introverted modus. This can be shown with a simple phenomenological experiment. If you look at what is in front of you right now, say a desk with an open periodical on it, you can zoom in on whatever you like: the exact form of each letter in the text, the quality of the paper, the patterns in the wood of the desktop, the length of a pencil etc. If you then close your eyes and try to remember the desktop scene – that is, intend the desktop in one of the introverted modes – this possibility of choosing among a wealth of detail vanishes. In the introverted mode, only a schematic memory is accessible.

These phenomenological constraints appear in spoken language by means of *selectivity* of details in the introverted mode – and we may add that the introverted mode is the headline for a series of subtypes to which we return below: memory, anticipation, fantasy, thought experiment, etc. When telling an anecdote for instance, the details are selected for informative value and for their fitting into the relevant narrative schema. This can be seen in the following example from Chafe's corpus of conversation recordings:

I went out for a stroll on my first time on Chestnut Street, and just was astounded at how pleasant things were. And as I was out for a stroll, a man watering his lawn, turned to me, as I walked past, and said, good evening. (Chafe, p. 198, here (and elsewhere) without Chafe's symbols for speech transcription).

The details mentioned are just sufficient to establish a recognizable schematic scene, deliver the central feeling of surprise and joy, and the climax of the neighbour's greeting. No listener could expect more details than this, and certainly it would be strange if the speaker had begun zooming in on the look of the pavement in Chestnut street, the colour of the neighbor's clothes, the pace of the speaker's own walk etc. Such a speaker would either appear boring, irrelevant, or be found to tell not an anecdote but a story.

Concerning the category detail, spoken language in the extroverted mode is much more "messy", bound to the changing demands and interests of the present now and most often presupposing the common or shared perceptions of the conversation partners. The crucial fact in this context is that in the extroverted mode, a speaker or experiencing consciousness has a virtual infinity of detail at hand.

Closely related to the category detail is the next category: *continuity* (of experience). Again we may begin to look at the matter from a phenomenological point of view. What interests us is the flow of the 'Umwelt' in the extroverted mode compared

with the discontinuity of the introverted mode. When focusing on the here and now, the moment constantly moves into the past while the future at all times move into the moment – cf. the well-known phenomenological analyses of the flow of time. Nothing can be changed about this. One cannot interrupt the continuously ongoing "movie" of reality displaying itself in front of our eyes. The opposite holds for memory and imagination of future or fictive scenarios. A memory is, in Chafe's words, "an island" in the mind with a certain beginning and a certain end, and such islands may be moved around in ways that go against their original temporal order. I may for example think of my childhood and afterwards of my birth, etc.

The island-like nature of scenes in the introverted mode calls for a spatiotemporal orientation or setting when someone is speaking in this mode. Sitting at a table with friends, it is normal to say something like: "I have got to tell you this. Last Saturday, at the party ...", while it would seem rather strange just to mention the point without the initial orientation: "... he kissed me!". However, if in fact the lover comes to the table and kisses the hand of the speaker, she might perfectly well exclaim: "He kissed me!" In that context it would seem peculiar to say: "It is Saturday night, we are at the party and he is kissing me!" So, the rule is that the continuity of extroversion makes an explicit orientation or setting superfluous while a more or less explicit orientation is necessary in the introverted mode. An example of this difference is given if we compare the above quotation of a speaker telling an anecdote with the following transcription of a conversation in the extroverted mode, again from Chafe's corpus:

A. I think I should take this away.

B. Uh.

A. Are you guys still eating it?

B. Just hold it, for just a moment, if you don't mind, and just slop, another little bit in here.

(Chafe 196-197).

It is not necessary for the speakers here to specify what "it" is referring to, or at what time or place slopping and holding should be taking place.

The last of the three categories is that of deixis, the elements in language that locate an experience in space and time and in relation to the category "person". Deictic elements are: adverbs of time (fx. now, then, today, tomorrow), adverbs of space (fx. there, here), tense and pronouns.

The distinction in deixis between the two modes of consciousness is quite simple. Normally, words like "here" and "now" will express that the matter referred to is co-temporal and co-present with the speaker, and they are, as such, typical for the extroverted mode. Words like "then" and "there" on the other hand, express that the subject is displaced in time and/or space and these are thus typical for the introverted mode. Similarly, the present tense is typical for the extroverted mode, while the past tense and the future tense are typical for the introverted. The use of first person or third person, respectively, expresses identity or non-identity between the person speaking and person talked about.

After his analysis of spoken language, Chafe moves on to an analysis of the more complex issue of immediacy and displacement in written texts, and he especially focuses on fiction. Using the insights developed in the linguistic markings of extroversion and introversion, he makes the central point: what distinguishes fiction from conversational language is that displacement and immediacy may here appear co-present. Displaced immediacy, Chafe calls this combination, and with reference to a distinction between "represented consciousness" and "representing consciousness" Chafe thus makes possible a subtle and surprising solution of the old problem raised by

Hamburger: the widespread modification in fiction of past tense with "present time" or "future time" adverbs.

Before we can develop Chafe's solution, however, the distinction between "represented consciousness" and "representing consciousness" must be developed. The two concepts are based upon the double role played by consciousness in speech: consciousness is being represented and at the same time it is responsible for the act of representing. If I say "I am crazy about spaghetti" something in my consciousness, namely my love for spaghetti, is represented in the utterance. But at the same time, it is in my consciousness that the words are being formed, and it is here that it is decided to say "crazy about" instead of "love" or "really like". A more cautious way of expressing it would be to say that represented and representing, content and act of the conscious intention, here share the basic quality of referring to the same here-and-now issue.^{ix}

In most spoken language, Chafe will say that it is the same consciousness which plays the two roles – or, as we might say, the two consciousnesses are aspects of one and the same intentional act structure. Thus, if we look again at the example of language in the extroverted mode, and take the following sentence

Just hold it, for just a moment, if you don't mind, and just slop, another little bit in here.

the consciousness which has a wish for more food is the same consciousness that expresses this wish. And if we look at the example of language in the introverted mode,

I went out for a stroll on my first time on Chestnut Street, and just was astounded at how pleasant things were.

– the consciousness that is turned inward towards the memory of "the first time on Chestnut Street" is the same consciousness that verbalizes this memory. In the last example there is of course also a representation of an extroverted consciousness, namely the consciousness which "back then" had its experience on Chestnut Street. However, that extroverted consciousness is only represented secondarily *as remembered*, and this is precisely evident from the lack of extroversion markers.

So, in most spoken language, it is the same consciousness which is representing and being represented. But as we shall now see, it is a common feature of enunciation in fictional, written texts that a dissociation may appear between the two. Let us look again at the Jacobsen example discussed earlier, in terms of Chafe's categories.

On a Sunday morning early in September, Marie Grubbe stood looking out of the dormer window in Mistress Rigitze's house. Not a vehicle in sight! Nothing but staid footsteps, and now and then the long drawn cry of the oystermonger. The sunlight quivering over roofs and pavements, threw sharp, black, almost rectangular shadows. The distance swam in a faint bluish heat mist.

»At-tention!« called a woman's voice behind her, cleverly mimicking the raucous tones of one accustomed to much shouting of military orders.

Marie turned. Her aunt's maid, Lucie, had for some time been sitting on the table appraising her own well-formed feet with critical eyes. Tired of this occupation, she had called out and now sat swinging her legs and laughing merrily. (p. 18).

First of all, the comparatively high resolution of detail in the passage gives the impression of an extroverted consciousness. One is led to imagine an unlimited access

to the amount of details outside Marie's window, the sounds of footsteps and a monger shouting, the play of the sunlight on the buildings etc., and this gives the impression of a perceptual consciousness in the midst of things, perceiving what is outside as well as what is inside the room.

Moving on to the question of continuity, we get a mixed picture. On the one hand the passage begins with a background orientation of time and place. After this orientation, however, the passage is continuous with regard to Marie's experience. The reader senses that Lucie's shouting takes place immediately after Marie's perception of the street outside the window, and her laughing, in turn, after her shouting. But then again, the information of what Lucie's *had been doing*, (the sitting and the appraising, given in the past perfect tense), forms a discontinuity, a discontinuity with two possible interpretations: either it forms a part of Marie's continuous flow of thoughts, a moment of introversion in the midst of the stream of extroversion, or it is an interruption on the part of the anonymous narrator, the same narrator that provided the background information to begin with.

Turning to the question of deixis, the picture is again a mixed one, confirming the idea that there is more than one consciousness present in the passage. On the one hand, we note the use of the past and of third person. This signifies displacement: the instance speaking is not co-present with what is being experienced, and not identical with the one experiencing. Thus, it signifies introversion. On the other hand, we have the element "now" which is normally used in the extroverted mode. This gives the impression of a consciousness co-present with the events, an impression backed by the fine granularity of detail and by the continuity of experiences.

At this point of the analysis, the dichotomy of represented and representing consciousness becomes of seminal importance, because what we find here is a *dissociation* of the two, the two which were almost always intimately related in spoken language: The represented consciousness is extroverted while the representing consciousness is introverted. And the latter has, furthermore, an identity different from the former. It belongs to what we sometimes refer to as 'the narrator'.

Thus, Chafe's solution to the Hamburger problem is not to follow her cancellation of any consciousness behind the fictive statements, but rather a *doubling* of consciousness^x. The reason why the element "now" may be co-present with past tense morphemes is that these two types of elements have different deictic centers. Adverbs of time and place have the *represented* consciousness as their deictic center, while the system of tense and the system of pronouns have the *representing* consciousness as their deictic center, a distinction which is most often not evident in everyday nonfiction speech with its close connection between the two. Thus the former is nested within the latter in Hamburger's "epic past" which is thus no subjectless discourse, even if the representing consciousness may indeed, in many cases, be anonymous and not participate explicitly in any way in the narrative action sequence.

Thus, Chafe's theory rests on the overall idea that the cognitive, semiotic motivation behind enunciation is the need for the representation of consciousness in language – including its many, more or less complicated nested forms of consciousness about consciousness which may be aesthetically elaborated in literature.

Clarifying as Chafe's theory indeed is, much detail needs to be elaborated in order to construct a detailed cognitive theory of enunciation. Talmy's challenge of seeking the limits of the notion of perspective point will guide us in the second, constructive half of this paper where we shall attempt at providing an outline of subtypes of consciousness representations, based on analyses of fiction examples.

"Continuity" and "detail": borderline cases

First of all we would like to look more closely at the categories "continuity" and "detail", two of the three categories by which Chafe makes his distinction between extroversion and introversion. What interests us is that the temporal continuity of a displaced perceptual experience may be reproduced in many different resolutions or granularities. While it is sufficient in order to represent a distal extroverted consciousness that the represented flow of perceptual events markedly exceeds the schematic event structure typical for memory, this extension may happen to many different degrees, and it is even easy to imagine borderline cases where it becomes difficult in the linguistic representation to ascertain whether the event flow is sufficiently smooth to grant the existence of a perceiving consciousness or whether it is rather a case of schematic event memory.

Under the headline of "continuity", Chafe does not mention the notion of a time structure belonging to consciousness itself. Talmy briefly touches upon the issue, and the notion does seem an important and related issue to the continuity of experience. We are thinking of the average *velocity* with which the world of perception appears. When events are presented either in a faster way (summing up: "He went to Madrid that summer. Next year he went to France."), or a slower way (meticulously analyzing event structure in richer detail as compared to our daily experience), we sense the presence of a narrator/ a representing consciousness. When, however, events are presented at a pace that effectively mimics consciousness, it is easily accepted as an extroverted consciousness, that is: an on-line consciousness perceiving and acting upon its immediate environment.

There are however also examples of event presentation in an intermediary position between extroverted and introverted event velocity. Here one from Franz Kafka:

... ruhig stehen die Pferde; der Schneefall hat aufgehört; Mondlicht ringsum; die Eltern des Kranken eilen aus dem Haus; seine Schwester hinter ihnen; man hebt mich fast aus dem Wagen; den verwirrten Reden entnehme ich nichts; im Krankenzimmer ist die Luft kaum atembar. (p. 108)

It is easy to accept the first part of the passage as a representation of the country doctor's extroverted consciousness. The impressionistic style with one un-interpreted sensory experience or evaluation per semicolon effectively mimics the prototypic "consciousness velocity". However as a sensitive reader might appreciate, between "man hebt mich fast aus dem Wagen" and "im Krankenzimmer ist die Luft kaum atembar" there is a temporal gap that is not sufficiently covered by the evaluation in the middle: "den verwirrten Reden entnehme ich nichts". The gap seems to transgress the mentioned velocity in an accelerating gesture, and we register the representing and organising instance behind the protagonist.

A similar case argument could be made with reference to detail where Chafe's argument is that a certain amount of narratologically superfluous perceptual detail indicates the (maybe pretended) presence of a perceiver – again in contrast to the memory case where only few details in addition to those salient for the event structure are usually present. But also in this case, there is a continuum between prototypical perceptual consciousness with rich detail representation on the one hand and prototypical memory consciousness with sparse, schematic detail only, on the other hand, and displaced immediacy may come in many different detail granularities.

Style indirect libre - contamination between character and narrator point-of-view

While the alterity of time and space are easily determined by the discontinuous grammatical markers of tense, adverbs, and person, much more intermediate cases are possible with respect to alterity of consciousness. This is nowhere clearer than in the classical case of *style indirect libre*, or, as Chafe chooses to rename it, "verbatim indirect speech". He prefers this notion to the established term because it describes the device in more positive terms by referring to its crucial marker: that of the presence of bits or aspects of verbatim spoken language within text parts which might at a first glance seem to be indirect, referred speech or third-person narration only. This, of course, is what gives that device its well-known liveliness and indication of the presence of a represented speaking or thinking consciousness. But the free character of that device of course lies in the fact that it is a very relative, contextually dependent issue to determine what counts, in a given text, as elements of verbatim speech. It must in some sense, of course, deviate from the prose of the narrator in order to indicate the presence of another, nested consciousness in the text – but this implies that it depends delicately on the style of the narrator in non-verbatim mode. Of course an expression like "Hell, no, this was too much now." may be read as a classical example of verbatim indirect speech, but if the narrator himself is saying "Hell, no" all of the time, it may be less easy to determine.

The typical case appears, of course, in a text in the past tense with third-person narrator who does not himself participate in the narration, but even in that case, the presence of verbatim indirect speech may be a very delicate issue. Chafe briefly mentions this in his discussion of displaced immediacy in written third-person fiction. When discussing Hemingway's short-story "Big Two-Hearted River" with its hero Nick, Chafe writes:

Other events are ambiguous as to internal versus external experience:

Nick walked back up the ties to where his pack lay in the cinders beside the railway track ... He adjusted the pack harness around the bundle ... Nick leaned back against a stump and slipped out of the pack harness ... Nick sat down.

These are not perceptions or evaluations but actions, and as such they could be perceived by an external observing self. However, when they are placed in a context of displaced immediacy that has been established in other ways, Nick's overt actions are also interpreted as experienced by him. A sensitive reader may appreciate the fact that a statement like *Nick sat down* is ambiguous in terms of consciousness. Its ordinary interpretation may be one in which an outside observer remembered this event. But in the context of this story the same statement is understood as Nick's own experiencing of what he did. (Chafe, p. 255)

In the Hemingway case, Nick as point-of-view is easily established "in other ways" in the context of the short-story. He is the only protagonist of the story, and there are other parts of the story in which his inner life is referred to by means of "elaborated referred-to thought" or "verbatim uncommitted thought" and so the indecidability as to the status of expressions like "Nick sat down" is easily removed: they do refer to his inner experience of sitting down. Chafe does not, however, comment on the possibilities present when no such unambiguous context permits the reader to establish which extroverted consciousness is at stake.

Take Knut Hamsun as an example. In his last novel, *Ringens sluttet*, he often employs a style that makes it difficult to determine whether a paragraph is mere third-

person description of events or whether it is rather the same events experienced and represented by verbatim indirect speech (or thought) in one of the characters. The technique is of course fully deliberate and support important themes in the novel.

Take this paragraph about the behaviour of Lili after an argument with her husband Alex about her lover Abel:

Lili took it arrogantly and did not answer. It was an assumed silence, but it seemed natural. It was she who had made payments on the house and the garden, she had been a cashier and had held a high position while her husband had merely been a worker handling logs. Could she not afford, then, to smile at the affected twaddle and the half-dead eyes of a drunken man? Should think so. (p. 72)^{xi}

This artistic usage of verbatim indirect speech only becomes obvious only in the two last periods and especially the last three words of the paragraph. Until then, the whole paragraph might just as well be a pure third-person description of Lili's behaviour, as such third-person description forms the bulk of the novel whose main protagonist is not Lili, but Abel. This implies two things: one is that when the presence of verbatim indirect speech finally becomes clear, then it becomes indecidable where in the paragraph it begins; all of the paragraph may now be the observation, not by the not-impersonated third-person narrator, but by a consciousness differing from that narrator. Furthermore, it is not evident *to whom* this consciousness belongs. It may easily be Lili herself, arguing with herself about the her rights to ignore her husband – but it might just as well be any well-informed observer in the small-town universe which the book as a whole depicts, an anonymous observer judging the social rightfulness of Lili's behaviour. For the first interpretation counts the introduction of the paragraph, dealing with Lili's intention; for the second interpretation counts the fact that its conclusion, "Should think so" sounds spoken rather than thought, and points to verbatim indirect speech rather than verbatim indirect thought. There is even the third possibility that the construction may refer to *both* Lili's consciousness and the average small-town informant – the argument given about her social standing being higher than her husband's refers to intersubjective social norms in the town, and this argument may be generic to the town as well as internalized by Lili at one and the same time. By this ingenious technique, Hamsun reproduces the claustrophobic cycle of information and judgment in the small town which forms a central part of the novel's main theme: Abel's status as a marginal tramp in the tightly woven network of strict values and social control in a Norwegian provincial town. Knowledge and social judgments are circulating as a crucial part of the maintenance of the public opinion and social structure, but any exact source of such information and values remains obscure – just like it remains indecidable to whom the interpolated consciousness in the paragraph quoted belongs. Thus, this technique forms a sophisticated version of Talmy's observation that enunciation may include points of view which are not upheld by single, individual consciousnesses but rather by intentions belonging to larger social entities.

The fact that verbatim indirect speech or thought may be indicated by means of as little as one word only makes it an extremely plastic device. In Chafean third person displaced immediacy, it may be used to discretely let the narrator peek into a rapidly changing selection of his characters. In Danish discussions of enunciation, a famous example was picked by the semiotician Harly Sonne in the works of the late 19th century Danish impressionist novelist Herman Bang. In the opening scene of his small novel *Ved Vejen*, a setting in a Danish provincial town railway station is outlined as follows:

The station keeper changed his coat for the train. – Bloody little time, he said and stretched out. He had been dozing a bit over the accounts.

He lit a cigar bud and went out on the platform. When he walked up and down like that, his clothes tightly fitting and his hands in both coat pockets, you could still register the lieutenant. Also in his legs, they had kept their rounding from the cavalry.

Five to six peasant hands had come and stood legs apart in a lump midways in front of the station building; the station porter carried forth the luggage, a single green-painted box which looked as if dropped by the roadside.

The priest's daughter, tall as a guardsman, tore open the platform entrance and came in. (p. 9)^{xii}

In the last period, the description of the priest's daughter as "tall as a guardsman" (in Danish expressed in one word only, "garderhøj") momentarily hands over the point of view to the station keeper whose military background has just been presented. The idea of describing the girl's tallness by means of this unfeminine military metaphor indicates that she, entering the scene, is briefly seen from the perspective of the former officer. In this way, Bang's third-person narrator is able to present quickly shifting viewpoints colouring the events by seeing them through different characters of the plot, giving the writing style its characteristic impressionism with lots of points of viewpoints.

Irony: elaborate enunciation hierarchies

The example of Bang makes a fine occasion for discussing the concept of *irony*, a device with intimate ties to enunciation. In its very nature irony is dependent on the presence of both a representing and a represented consciousness, the former more informed than the latter. In some cases there may even be a three layer sandwich where an "implied" representing consciousness is ironic in his way of making a narrator represent a character. Such cases call for an elaboration of the Chafian model with only two enunciative levels.

Bang's impressionistic style permits lots of irony, an irony dependent on the two intermingling planes of consciousness, on the one hand the narrator, and on the other the many shifting points of view belonging to different characters. Very often a consciousness which has been briefly introduced is given its voice for presenting one consciousness or personality aspect only – an aspect which may then easily be ridiculed by the third-person tongue-in-cheek narrator. This also goes for our example above: After the quoted passage about the station keeper and the priest's daughter, "tall as a guardsman", the next sentence reads: "The station keeper clicked his heels together and greeted." – here, we are immediately taken out of his consciousness again to see that his excess of military manners as a mere station keeper is obviously an object of ridicule.

Hans Christian Andersen demonstrates again and again the three-level kind. Let us take an example from "The Snow Queen". The fairytale begins in the following way:

All right, let's get started! When we're at the end of the story, we'll know more than we do now, because there was an evil troll ... (p. 169).

What we see is an extroversion of the narrator who in a direct address to his young audience asks them to join him and listen to the story. The extroversion is marked by the presence tense and the inclusion of the narrator in the first person plural: "we". The thus explicated narrator is not, however, to be taken at face value but forms a classical example of an unreliable narrator. The innocence of his motifs and the childishness of

his language – (note especially the clumsy use of the subordinate conjunction "because") is part of Andersen's aesthetic strategy and choice of genre: the pastiche of the fairy tale – this duplicity corresponding to Andersen's double audience of implied readers: children for the fairy-tale, grown-ups for the irony of the fairy-tale pastiche.

Thus, already in the first three clauses, an irony has been established, an irony that is still present when the actual narrating begins, marked by the shift to the past tense: "because there was an evil troll". And so, when the narrator starts representing the characters, we have three enunciative layers where an irony can be employed between the higher on the one hand, and the two lower ones on the other. We see this in the following quote where the implied author has his explicated narrator represent the main character Gerda using verbatim indirect thought. The truthful, heartfelt empathy with Gerda's sorrow is the ironic mask:

How was Gerda doing now that Kai was gone? Where was he? No one knew and no one could tell her. (p. 177).

Of course, it is not the case that Andersen does not mean what he is writing, that he takes it as a joke. The irony is a fine, subtle one that allows both for an innocent, childish reading, and a more aesthetically informed, adult reading, and it is precisely this duality that is the mark of Andersen's craftsmanship.

We see that the ironic stance towards an extroverted narrator and his reader is possible only because of an introverted, representing consciousness "behind" the (explicit) narrator. So the three layer sandwich looks as follows: A protagonist (represented consciousness), a narrator (sometimes introverted, sometimes extroverted), and a meta-level narrator (implied author) – always introverted. In this cognitive account, we thus re-establish an old finding of enunciation studies^{xiii}: whenever a narrator is, ever so briefly, made extrovert, this extroversion immediately implies a higher-level, introverted narrator responsible for representing him. In literature with complicated enunciation hierarchies, it may be rather difficult to establish this highest organizing and narrating consciousness – which is, of course, the fact which lent credibility to Hamburger's radical cut-his-head solution in the first place. Whether it is possible for human beings to grasp intuitively more than three enunciative layers at the time, is an open question. The fact that we may grasp three is related to what distinguishes us from animals. Some higher animals may pretend, but only humans may pretend to pretend.^{xiv}

In there, out there: a refinement of the account for the role of deixis

The use of the temporal adverb "now" in the two quotes from Andersen above leads us to the complex issue of adverbs in the deixis system. In the first quote, it has the extroverted narrator as its reference point and thus refers to the time of the narrating. In the second quote, it has Gerda's consciousness as its reference point, and we get the typical modification in past tense fiction with a present tense adverb. All this is accounted for by Chafe, but there are some important subtleties of the deixis category and its employment in fiction that he does not discuss.

We recall that deixis is the last of the three categories by means of which Chafe distinguishes the extroverted and the introverted consciousness modes, and on the issue of time- and space adverbs his idea is that the use of "here" and "now" conveys the fact that the event referred to coincides with the time and place of the represented consciousness (p. 205), while "[w]ords like *there* and *then* locate an event or state at a place or time that is *not* that of the consciousness being represented" (ibid.). Chafe does

not in any way vary this basic account, an omission which on this particular point makes his theory tendentially simplistic and potentially misleading.

The problem is that the distinctions now/then and here/there display a high degree of flexibility in relation to their respective domains (time and space), a flexibility which makes them less than unambiguous as reference points for the distinction between extroversion and introversion. Now/then may signify "this second/two minutes ago", but also "modern times/prehistoric time" or "human time/cosmological time". Similarly, here/there may signify "within/without this square inch" but also "on this/that planet". As closed class elements time- and space adverbs have what Talmy calls a topological semantics, creating borders and divisions independent of metrics and therefore "stretchable" from the smallest to the largest of scales. Therefore, words like "then" or "there" can easily be used in passages within displaced immediacy without interrupting the flow of the represented consciousness.

An example from Ingmar Bergman's *Fanny and Alexander* may illustrate the point. In the quote, the artistically minded boy Alexander is telling his younger sister Fanny and the evil house servant Justina a made-up story about meeting a ghost. His way of telling the story, namely in the form of displaced immediacy, is an important point as it underlines his artistic and imaginative mind and marks his opposition to Justina who has just tried to scare the children with a similar ghost story – only told in a much more bleak, schematic mode. The relevant passage is as follows:

Alexander: I have seen them.

Fanny: Who?

Alexander: The misses and the children of course.

Justina: Is Alexander telling the truth?

Alexander: On my word of honour as a Swedish citizen.

Fanny: Where did you see them?

Alexander: I had been to the library with my Mother's husband. He was yelling at me ... I don't remember why. I went through the living room. It was strangely bright. Then through an open door, I saw the first little girl. She just ran by, as if on her toes. I didn't hear anything. After that the other one came, the older one, the one who has such dark hair and such big eyes. She stopped and looked at me and made a kind of sign for me to turn around. And *there*, heavily lit by the sunlight stood the misses herself in her black dress. She said with a low, almost not hearable voice that I should not be angry. That she had something to tell me.

(Ingmar Bergman: *Fanny och Alexander*, Cinematograph 1982.)

Alexander's narrative bears the hallmarks of an extroverted consciousness: it is continuous and rich in detail. But what about the word "*there*" heavily stressed in Alexander articulation? Does it, as Chafe suggests, convey the fact that Alexander is merely remembering the event and not representing his (imagined) consciousness as it experienced the scene "back then" in medias res? Not at all. Quite on the contrary, the word "*there*" *adds* to the vividness of the boy's story, making us feel how he sees the ghost right there in front of him, and we understand that it is perfectly legitimate to use both "then" and "there" *within* represented extroverted consciousness. For when first such a reference point has been introduced, the time-space slice it occupies may be further subdivided temporally as well as spatially, and within that time-space slice the experiencing consciousness may easily refer to different locations in time and space.

Another issue in this context is the strange fact that the temporal adverbs seem somehow "stronger" than the spatial adverbs. "Now" in connection with past tense is used more often and to a more immediate effect than "here" (even if it is indeed

perfectly possible to use "here" in this way: "She sat down in the sofa. Here, she felt comfortable."). This is probably due to the dimension difference between time and space: "Now" potentially refers to a point, or a very brief moment permitting precise "transfer" of consciousness to another place on the time line, while the three-dimensionality of space implies that there is always, even within the shortest time span, a virtual distinction between different locations in the spatial region dealt with in that moment or timespan. 3-dimensional space is somehow "richer" than time which makes time the more unambiguous means of transport to another consciousness.

A last note should be made about counterfactual use of deixis with aesthetic motivation. What we see in Kafka is that authors are not always following a consistent path when it comes to grammar and syntax, which is to some extent in conflict with Chafe's theory. It is even possible to go further than Kafka and momentarily dissolve the point of view by juxtaposing two reciprocal perspectives. In the following example from J.P. Jacobsen we are first inside a house looking out along with the protagonist, but after a comma we immediately move outside and look inside:

The wind blew and the darkness fell outside [derude], but within [derinde] the fire glowed, the light played, and Marie Grubbe was singing. (p. 159).

The example works best in the original, where the double use of the suffix "der-" (there) makes the two pointing gestures evident. A translation capturing this effect would have out there/in there instead of outside/within.

Selectivity of the represented consciousness

A whole special issue is the question of *how much* of the represented consciousness is present in the displaced immediacy mode. A purely perceptual conscious is perfectly possible where the narrator has access to the perceptual experiences of a person – but without having any access to his memory, imagination, world view, judgments, etc. The ability of a third-person narrator to enter the minds of the represented characters is usually called "omniscience", but it is a crucial aspect of such omniscience that the narrator may choose freely which parts of those consciousnesses he wants to share with the reader, omniscience thus coming in many different degrees.

Often, but not always, such "truncated" consciousnesses receives some kind of motivation in the plot: if the person in question is shocked and busily trying to cope with some important ongoing event, it appears natural that the better part of the consciousness of that person is occupied with interpreting actual perceptions and acting upon them. As an example, take the enunciation structure of the eminent first chapter of Don DeLillo's *Underworld* (1997) dealing with different experiences of the "homer" finishing a famous 1951 baseball game in New York.

Look at Cotter under a seat.

All over the city people are coming out of their houses. This is the nature of Thomson's homer. It makes people want to be in the streets, joined with others, telling others what has happened, those few who haven't heard – comparing faces and states of mind.

And Russ has a hot mike in front of him and has to find someone to take it and talk so he can get down to the field and find a way to pass intact through all that mangle.

And Cotter is under a seat headfighting someone for the baseball. He is trying to get a firmer grip. He is trying to isolate his rival's hand so he can

prise the ball away finger by finger. (...)

People make it a point to read the time on the clock atop the notched facade of the clubhouse, the high battlement – they register the time the ball went in.

It is a small tight conflict of fingers and inches, a lifetime of effort compressed into seconds.

He gets his hands around the rival's arm just above the wrist. He is working fast, thinking fast – too much time and people take sides.

The rival, the foe, the ofay, veins stretched and bulged between white knuckles. If people take sides, does Cotter have a chance? (p. 47-48)

The third person narrator is ingeniously soaring around the baseball public witnessing the seminal event, both at the stadium and more generally among radio listeners across town. The narrator is like a camera, busily cutting back and forth from the black boy Cotter trying to catch the historical baseball among the stadium seats and to an aerial view of the whole city and to other baseball viewers. At the stadium, the narrator suddenly appears in guise of a fellow audience observer, encouraging the reader, now momentarily also embodied as a spectator in the stadium crowd, to look at the fight developing between two boys trying to catch the ball as a trophy: "Look at Cotter ..."

The point of view may even wander into some of the characters' consciousness, as in the last part of the quote where the hands of Cotter's rival, clutching the ball, are seen from Cotter's close-up viewpoint: "... veins stretched and bulged between white knuckles". Here Cotter's consciousness remains perceptual only, which is perfectly natural in the setting where he is fighting intensely and has little room left for memory or imagination. An effect not far from Hamsun's is provided by the last period of the quote: "If people take sides, does Cotter have a chance?" The question is obviously uttered *in medias res*, but by whom and to whom? Maybe by Cotter himself, referring to himself in the third person like in some black subculture communities – or maybe by the narrator, momentarily situated among the observers of the fighting? In any case, the question in a subtle way refers to Cotter's being black while his opponent's whiteness (his white knuckles tellingly being observed by Cotter) might lead more spectators to support him. In any case, Cotter's focusing upon the fight and its possible outcome immediately makes it natural to represent primarily his perceptual consciousness and (maybe) a brief tactical consideration.

In other cases, such reasons for partial consciousness representations lack in the plot and it becomes difficult to see why the reader is denied access to parts of that person's consciousness. It may even conflict with narrative structure. An example of this is offered by the actual bestseller by Dan Brown, *The Da Vinci Code*. Here we have a non-acknowledged third-person narrator with omniscience as to the inner life of his persons. The narrator thus having continuous access to the consciousness of the novel's heroine Sophie Neveu, it remains a suspenseful mystery stretched over many chapters what she actually saw as a young woman in a basement hall many years ago, leading her to refuse, for many years up to the present now, to see her grandfather (she saw him have sex with a fat woman as part of some templar ritual).

While busily fleeing the police in a small car together with the novel's hero, the symbologist dr. Langdon, she takes time to remember at length the occasion leading to her allegedly nauseating discovery of grandfatherly sexuality. Over four pages, she dwells in continuous detail with the memory of how she approached his house, discovered chanting sounds from the cellar and descended the stairs. Her long memory chain ends like this:

Everyone in the room was wearing a mask. The women were dressed in white gossamer gowns and golden shoes. Their masks were white, and in their hands they carried golden orbs. The men wore long black tunics, and their masks were black. They looked like pieces in a giant chess set. Everyone in the circle rocked back and forth and chanted in reverence to something on the floor before them ... something Sophie could not see.

The chanting grew steady again. Accelerating. Thundering now. Faster. The participants took a step inward and knelt. In that instant, Sophie could finally see what they all were witnessing. Even as she staggered back in horror, she felt the image searing itself into her memory forever. Overtaken by nausea, Sophie spun, clutching at the stone walls as she clambered back up the stairs. Pulling the door closed, she fled the deserted house, and drove in a tearful stupor back to Paris. (153)

There are many things which do not fit in this piece of successful bad writing, and only the suspense and speedy cross cut technique of the novel may make the reader forget the obvious incongruences. How is Sophie able to process a memory so long and detailed during a speedy car drive which is less than a mile (149) in a nightly, almost traffic-less Paris, supposedly a drive not exceeding much two minutes? Why does a grown-up, sophisticated and experienced French woman act like an American high school girl at the simple sight of two middle-aged persons having intercourse? At its core, the problem is enunciative. The four page memory is written with continuity of events and with rich detail – indicating the presence of a perceiving consciousness (complete with present-time adverbs and past-tense verbs) which is not the case as we know from the context that Sophie is merely remembering past events during a breathless car flight. The central problem, of course, is why the very content of the image – which is "searing itself into her memory forever" – is kept away from the representation of her consciousness

If it had been some event in the narration which had broken off Sophie's tale of her discovery, we might have had a reason to accept that she does not reveal the core of her experience. If, e.g., her discovery of police blocking the road in front of the car (which follows immediately after the quote given) had broken off her memory stream just before the crucial memory image appeared, the concealment of this important piece of information for the reader might not have been so awfully clumsy as is now the case. In short, we hear all about her memory - except the very most central part of it. The enunciation structure is obviously crafted that way for reasons of suspense: the reader is told nothing more than that she saw something very disgusting, impressive and important, sufficient reason for her to refuse to see her grandfather for many years despite many attempts from his side – but in order to enhance the reader's curiosity and anxiety, this information is simply withheld from the text, despite the narrator's omniscience and his otherwise free access to Sophie's thoughts and feelings. There is no reason given in the text for this split of Sophie's consciousness (crude Freudian reasons might be invented, of course: she had repressed the frightening sight ever after, but the text itself does not support such ideas, claiming that the image imprinted itself in her memory "forever"), and it thus only adds to the impression of cheap effect-hunting in this page-turner. Only some 180 pages later the contents of the critical image is revealed, in another brief transport pause between events, when Langdon asks Sophie on their flight on a private plane to England, if what she saw back then might be some sex rite. Her "composure beginning to crack", she sobbingly tells Langdon about the shocking sight – a last peculiarity being her willingness immediately to reveal this allegedly painful memory to a complete stranger.

Selectivity and "diagrammatic consciousness" transgressing the intro/extroversion distinction

The holding back of information may have many good reasons – in some cases, it may for instance be part of a detailed working through of events past in an attempt to investigate which other possibilities there may have been for acting. Take the opening paragraphs of another strong first chapter of recent novel literature, Ian McEwan's *Enduring Love*. The first chapter tells the story of five men in a British park trying to rescue a child from going up in a drifting balloon, only to have four of them letting go, leaving the fifth to go up dangling from a rope and later dropping to a sure death – an event subsequently tying together the four survivors in a fateful community of guilt.

The beginning is simple to mark. We were in sunlight under a turkey oak, partly protected from a strong, gusty wind. I was kneeling on the grass with a corkscrew in my hand, and Clarissa was passing me the bottle – a 1987 Daumas Gassac. This was the moment, this was the pinprick on the time map: I was stretching out my hand, and as the cool neck and the black foil touched my palm, we heard a man's shout. We turned to look across the field and we saw the danger. Next thing, I was running towards it. The transformation was absolute: I don't recall dropping the corkscrew, or getting to my feet, or making a decision, or hearing the caution Clarissa called after me. What idiocy, to be racing into this story and its labyrinths, sprinting away from our happiness among the fresh spring grasses by the oak. There was the shout again, and a child's cry, enfeebled by the wind that roared in the tall trees along the hedgerows. I ran faster. And there, suddenly, from different points around the field, four other men were converging on the scene, running like me.

I see us from three hundred feet up, through the eyes of the buzzard we had watched earlier, soaring, circling and dipping in the tumult of currents: five men running silently towards the centre of a hundred-acre field. (...)

To the buzzard Parry and I were tiny forms, our white shirts brilliant against the green, rushing towards each other like lovers, innocent of the grief this entanglement would bring." (p. 1)

This paragraph has all the marks of a first person narrator remembering. He picks out and organizes all the details remembered in order to try to patch together what happened – interrupting himself with present comments about the wiseness of acting like he did ("What idiocy .."). The remembering of detail gives way to a deliberate construction in imagination where the narrator tries to see the whole event from a viewpoint three hundred feet above – presented as the viewpoint of the buzzard which grappled the balloon and so caused the disaster, a meteorological phenomenon momentarily equipped with human view but not with human emotions, understanding, or compassion. The reader has not yet been told the precise character of the catastrophic outcome of the events which the first person narrator of course knows very well all along, but this delay is – even explicitly so – motivated by his cautious attempt of reconstruction of what took place:

What I describe is shaped by what Clarissa saw too, by what we told each other in the time of obsessive re-examination that followed: the aftermath, an appropriate term for what happened in a field waiting for its early summer mowing. The aftermath, the second crop, the growth promoted by that first cut in May.

I'm holding back, delaying the information. I'm lingering in the prior moment because it was a time when other outcomes were still possible; the convergence of six figures in a flat green space has a comforting geometry from the buzzard's perspective, the knowable, limited plane of the snooker table. (2)

In contrast to the case in the *Da Vinci Code*, the withholding of information in the first chapter of *Enduring Love* has a natural motivation in the narrator's meticulously setting up of a thought experiment where he tries to involve all his – and his girlfriend's – knowledge of the situation to judge whether other outcomes than the actual, disastrous one had been possible. His slow reconstruction through the long first chapter forms an almost unbearable suspense motivated exactly in his almost scientific judging and testing of all details and thought experimenting about the causal interlinking of the event chain, leading up to the final enigma: who among the four would-be rescuers was the first to let go, thereby prompting the three others to follow and the fifth one to his tragic destiny?

The reconstruction is undertaken by a thought experiment splitting the narrator's consciousness in two and delegating one, impassioned version to contemplate the events from above. To see the event from the viewpoint of the triggering cause, the buzzard, is not undertaken in order to impart any guilt on the weather, but to abstract superfluous detail and grasp the essential structure of the event. In addition to being a well-motivated example of truncated consciousness, the *Enduring Love* quote also forms an example of a type of consciousness not discussed in Chafe's too simple dichotomy between introverted consciousness (memory, imagination, anticipation) and extroverted consciousness (perception, action, evaluation), namely the *diagrammatical thought experiment* addressing an ideal object – in this case, the event structure of what happened. As the examples make clear, the Chafean modes do not exhaust the possible characters of displaced immediacy, because there are cases where a represented consciousness is neither "... immediately affected by the environment" (Chafe 1994, 197) nor "... remembering or imagining" (ibid. 199). Of course, Chafe admits the possibilities of displaced memory consciousness (like Sophie Neveu's memory discussed above) or displaced imagination consciousness, but a conscious mode left untouched by Chafe is what Husserl calls "categorical intuition" – the contemplation of different ideal structures, including linguistic categories, ideal objects, abstractions, mathematical entities, universals, thought experiments, etc. Such acts of consciousness may seem specifically scientific or philosophical, but as the McEwan example might indicate, they are not rare in fiction nor in everyday real life thought processes.

Husserl had the idea that in such categorical intuitions, the distinction between perception and imagination vanishes – because the ideal contents envisaged may be just as fully present in aspects of an actual perception as they may be in aspects of an imagination. In the quote from *Enduring Love*, memory of the event, memory of other people's knowledge of the event, imagination, and categorical intuition as different sources to event knowledge are woven together in an idealized event model. When seeing things from the buzzard's point of view, the narrator is performing a thought experiment, trying to grasp the ideal structure of the event, sifting away irrelevant detail by means of assuming a view from afar. Such scale shift is common in the construction of diagrammatic or schematic representations of different phenomena, where one of the means of what Peirce called "prescission", the seeing away from irrelevant detail in order to grasp the type of a phenomenon, is scale change. The thought experimenting consciousness is, of course, taking place in the narrating present where the narrator looks back on the information and memory of the events and tries to get a deeper understanding of them. It involves, moreover, a peculiar time structure: it may be run

experimentally over and over again, investigating different possible outcomes in a trial-and-error process, using the ideal event model as a device for diagrammatical thought experiments. In this way, categorial intuition may make use of both memory, imagination, and perception but is irreducible to each of them. It intends an ideal object – in this case, the event structure of the balloon incident. Such ideal objects are not at all as rare in everyday conscious experience as an empiricist or otherwise simplistic perception theory might suppose. In some sense, this diagrammatical consciousness thus transgresses Chafe's distinction between extroverted and introverted, because it is not aimed exclusively at present, perceptual contents, nor at absent, remembered or imagined contents. It is only present within consciousness. Ideal objects, such as the object of thought experiments, may be objective and thus fully independent of the consciousness intending them (as most clearly is the case in mathematical or logical objectivities), but they are not, on the other hand, reducible to ordinary perceptual consciousness, even if they may, in many cases, be abstracted from such experiences. This explains why the narrator, in describing the buzzard's viewpoint, may easily shift between past and present tense. Using past tense, he positions his imagined view from above back at the event time ("To the buzzard Parry and I were tiny forms"), but using present tense he is talking about event structure as something objective and timeless, abstracted from event time. In "I see us from three hundred feet up ..." the present tense is narration time, while "... the convergence of six figures in a flat green space has a comforting geometry from the buzzard's perspective ..." is the ideal, "eternal" time of geometry or mathematics. This points to an important issue: the enunciative polysemy of present tense.

Multiple functions of present tense

Taking as our point of departure Chafe's theory of enunciation, it is highly relevant to look at some examples where the present tense is employed with an aesthetic motivation. A strange by-product, namely, of Chafe's interest in displaced immediacy in third person, past tense fiction, is that he tends to discard completely present tense as an aesthetic medium. Chafe's aesthetic norm in this respect is articulated as follows:

Art is created through whatever devices a medium may provide for "holding the mirror up to nature." (p. 232)

And, within the mode of displaced immediacy:

the mirror is the representing consciousness and nature the represented. To remove that difference [...] is like replacing a statue with a living model, a portrait with its subject. (ibid.)

A higher degree of dissociation between the representing and the represented consciousness equals a higher degree of aesthetic value^{xv}, according to Chafe, and present tense narration (and first person narration) is, in this sense, judged defective.

This normative aspect does not in any way detract from the value of Chafe's theory, but it is indeed both very strange and very problematic. On the one hand, one can point to a gallery fine pieces of fiction which have been written in the present tense, where in the better cases, the choice of tense form is deliberate and aesthetically motivated. Why, for example, does Raymond Carver choose to open his first collection of short stories, *Will you please be quiet, please?* with a piece in the present tense: "Fat"? There can of course be many answers to this question, but it is certain that in the particular short story, the present tense conflation of enunciation levels is an important

point, supporting the theme of the story.

The narrating "I" has been serving an extremely fat person at the coffee house where she is waiting tables, and now she is at her friend Rita's telling her about it – using historical present: "This fat man is the fattest person I have ever seen", (p. 3). The point of the story is that when at night her husband Rudy comes on to her in bed, she feels that *she* is "terrifically" fat, even though she is not. This feeling distresses her, and her whole discourse seems confused, as if she does not herself fully understand how the experience of serving the fat man relates to her own feeling of obesity. Obviously, her friend Rita does not understand either, and the story leaves the reader guessing as well. And it is this *unheimlich* feeling of a hidden but not quite graspable connection which is supported by the use of the present tense. Everything is on the same level, the experience at the coffee house and later with Rudy, the dialogue with Rita, the incident with Rudy in bed, the short inner monologue that ends the short story:

I feel I am terrifically fat, so fat that Rudy is a tiny thing and hardly there at all.

That is a funny story, Rita says, but I can see she doesn't know what to make of it. I feel depressed. But I won't go into it with her. I've already told her too much. She sits there waiting, her dainty fingers poking her hair.

Waiting for what? I'd like to know.

It is August.

My life is going to change. I feel it.

(p. 8)

Using the past tense would have given the story a completely different feel. Had it been employed all over, the displacement might have given an impression of a wiser woman looking back at a situation in which she was younger and not so experienced. The final two sentences could be taken at face value, and would give the reader a reason to believe that the narrator's life did in fact change to the better after the experience. And had it been employed only in the main character's story of the fat man at the coffee house, she would appear more at terms with it, the main point of the story appearing weaker as a consequence. The use of present tense is thus indispensable to Carver's presentation of a no-way-out embeddedness in the present now.

Aesthetic motivations for using the present as the main tense in a fiction piece, is one thing that Chafe's norm overlooks, while another is the whole issue of local *shifts* to the present in a past tense environment. The issue is indeed a huge one, and is not very well investigated in the relevant literature, at least not in the literature that we have mentioned in this article. In the following brief passages we will try and go over what we find to be the main types.

First of all there is the one-shift kind, where a story is at first narrated in one tense, and then at some point changes into another. This can go both ways and have various motivations. One is to mark by the tense shift an important event, and here a move from past to present seems to be more frequent, the present making the important event more vivid. Another effect is to make relative the narrator's relation to his story, asking the question of whether it has settled into a memory or whether the experience is not sedimented yet. The tense shift in Kafka's *Ein Landarzt* has both of these motivations, and we quote the relevant passage here:

Aber gleich standen sie aufrecht, hochbeining, mit dicht ausdampfendem Körper. "Hilf ihm", sagte ich, und das willige Mädchen eilte, dem Knecht das Geschirr des Wagens zu reichen. Doch kaum war es bei ihm, Umfaßt es der Knecht und schlägt sein Gesicht an ihres. Es schreit auf und flüchtet sich

zur mir [...] (p. 107).

The stableman's violent kissing of the house girl marks the threatening omnipresence of death and sexuality in the story world – this omnipresence being the story's main theme.

We find a similar use of the shift in tense the more quiet world of Guy de Maupassant's *Mademoiselle Pearl*, where the importance of the main character and her actions are marked with present tense:

They owned a small house with a garden, near the observatory. There they lived in true provincial fashion. [...]

Mlle Pearl, who keeps the keys of the kitchen cupboards [...] perceives that the sugar is coming to an end ... (p. 273)

The tense shift is also the main instrument in maneuvering between enunciative levels. It is used by narrators who like to talk and comment on what they are telling, and here the present will often be general or *gnomic*, expressing what is believed to be more or less universal and general truths about a given issue. From Anton Chekov "Enemies":

Aboguin and the doctor stood face to face, heaping each other with undeserved insults. Never in their lives, even in a frenzy, had they said so much that was unjust and cruel and absurd. In both the selfishness of the unhappy is violently manifest. Unhappy men are selfish, wicked, unjust, and less able to understand each other than fools.
(p. 364).

We see how Chekov sneaks in on the gnomic present by letting it follow a sudden shift to the historical present.

Just as the present tense can make us "move up" in the enunciation hierarchy, it must also be employed if we are to move down and have direct quotations from the characters in the story world, for instance in the form of interior monologue. The following example is from J.P. Jacobsen's *Niels Lyhne* where the narrator shows his empathy with Bartholine Lyhne, the main character of the novel's first chapters, by using verbatim indirect thought, and then immediately after by giving her the floor for some directly quoted thoughts (which may in fact be spoken in soliloquy):

But poems, on the other hand! For her they were full of new ideas and profound wisdom about life out in the world, where sorrow is black and joy is red, and they glittered with images, foaming and beaded with rhythms and rhyme. They were all about young girls [...].

And why shouldn't one be that kind of girl? They're so ... and they're so ... and they don't even know it. What do I know about how I am?

(p. 8).

Finally, the fact that the present tense is used to move up as well as down in the enunciation hierarchy, can be used by authors to create ambiguity, and a prominent example is found in Saul Bellow's short story "A Father-to-be" where the present tense ambiguity is used again and again making it the main structuring device of the story's enunciation. Here we are with the protagonist in the subway, and while looking at a dwarf who has just entered the train he is at the same time contemplating over a book that he might read. We have access to his mind through verbatim indirect thought, and it might be this that makes it hard to determine who has the word, when the tense shifts from past to present:

He had for many years owned De la Mare's *Memoirs*. Now he took a resolve; he would read it. As soon as he had decided, he was free from his consuming curiosity as to the dwarf's sex and was able to look at the person who sat behind him.

Thoughts very often grow fertile in the subway [...]. (400)

The same goes for the last quote.

For her, it was inevitable. But did it have to be inevitable for him? Well, then, Rogin, you fool, don't be a damned instrument. Get out of the way!

Along with these aesthetic functions of present tense, we can add that the diagrammatical consciousness addressing ideal objects, discussed earlier, is also typically expressed in present tense, referring to principal ideas more or less severed from any specific location in time. As against Chafe's disregard for present tense, we claim, quite on the contrary, that there exists a very wide variety of functions and, consequently, aesthetic possibilities in the uses of present tense. The linguist Suzanne Fleischmann takes timelessness (and not reference to the present now as in the Benveniste tradition) to be the basic, unmarked form of present tense, while the other forms are derived versions. This gives her an initial list of seven basic functions of present tense, as follows:

The market *is down* 50 points today. (PR cotemporal with now)

I *leave/ am leaving* for Paris next week (future)

I'm *sitting* in my office when suddenly this man *walks in* and *says* to me ...(past)

The Dean's Conference *meets* on Thursdays (habitual).

Dogs *have* fleas (generic)

A good man *is* hard to find (gnomic)

Two plus two *equals* four (timeless)

(Fleischmann 1990, p. 34)

- where the latter four general types of present tense is sometimes taken as subtypes under the general type of "generic" present tense. It is well-known that the third form under the headline of "historical present" plays a huge aesthetic role, but our examples here point to the fact that the aesthetic possibilities of the four generic forms and their combinations, both among each other and with the other three forms, have been far from studied exhaustingly.

Perspective distortions

On Chafe's account, the prototypical displaced immediacy is incarnated in a human consciousness. The challenge of this idea is, of course, a standard experiment possibility of fiction. Here, the possible "inside" of experiential qualities of strange, non-ordinary or non-human types of consciousness may be approached. The philosophical issue of "how it's like to be a bat" or any other living being may thus be experimentally investigated, just like being Minotaur, a concentration camp leader (both examples are from Jorge Luis Borges), gods, demons, heroes, villains, etc. – all of which may in some direction or other be seen as distortions of an average human consciousness.

One interesting issue here is embodiment. It is striking which variability of body shapes and types it is possible to identify with. Take for instance the immediacy with

which the ordinary reader identify with Disney's Goofy, even down to details as how it would feel from the inside to have his strange, oblong nose with its washboard structure and the large blackberry snout at the end. Fictional consciousnesses may stretch as far as inhabiting a conscious fog dispensing with the clear membrane or skin borderline of biological beings (the cosmological creature at a galactic scale of "the black fog" in Fred Hoyle's sci-fi novel of the same name), or Dracula sneakingly entering victim houses as a thin line of fog through a hole; in such foggy creatures, most features of embodied consciousness are dispensed with, only connectedness and searching for nourishment remains. Such imaginary, represented consciousnesses form diagram experiments on the basis of the prototypical human embodiment, dispensing with some of its features and exaggerating others. Our surprising ability immediately to be able to identify with higher animals has its basis in our sharing our basic physiological and anatomical *Bauplan* with other vertebrates, while invertebrates such as insects or mollusks pose tougher challenges to distorted embodiment representations. Further away on the distortion axes lie imagined beings like the Hoyle fog. Such experimental or even metaphorical extension of embodiment may indeed, like Talmy suggests, be stretched so as to subsume social groups or institutions of all sizes – this possibility probably being very basic, cf. the ability of people passionately to identify with the common sort of imagined, more or less objective, consciousness of their culture, religion, nation, or football club. The reference to such displaced immediacies and the status they may be given forms, of course, the basis for well-known problems in the domains of democratic representation and identity politics – such as the possible conflict between such assumed social points-of-view on the one hand and the individual consciousnesses forming their basis on the other. The seemingly innocent and technical enunciation issue of representing consciousness here shows up to involve large political subjects.

Perspective perspectives

A Chafean theory of enunciation rests on the overall idea that the cognitive, semiotic motivation behind enunciation is the basic need for the representation of consciousness in language – including its many nested forms of consciousness about consciousness about consciousness which may be aesthetically elaborated in literature and narratives more generally. It is interesting to note that very different linguistic and literary mechanisms are involved in such hierarchical consciousness representations. On the one hand, discontinuous grammatical devices such as tense, person, pronouns, time-and-space adverbs, intention verbs combine in order to provide skeletal versions of different consciousness representations – and these devices of course play center stage in traditional linguistic accounts for enunciation phenomena – cf. for instance Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1982. On the other hand, though, in order to provide the rich variety of consciousness representations of different types, these schematic skeletons need to be supplemented by more semantic indicators of a much more continuous sort. This includes for instance the temporal continuity of perceptual experience which may be reproduced (or pretended reproduced) in many different granularities. It seems sufficient to indicate the presence of a perceptual consciousness that the represented flow of events perceived exceeds the schematic event structure preserved in memory – but it may be exceeded to many different degrees, and it is even easy to imagine borderline cases where it becomes difficult to ascertain whether the event flow is sufficiently smooth to grant the existence of a perceiving consciousness or whether it is rather a case of schematic event memory. A similar problem is presented by the amount

of event detail where Chafe's argument is that a certain amount of superfluous perceptual detail indicates the (maybe pretended) presence of a perceiver – again in contrast to the memory case where only few details in addition to those important for the event structure are usually present. Also in this case, there is a continuum between prototypical perceptual consciousness with rich detail representation on the one hand and prototypical memory consciousness with sparse detail only, on the other hand, and the same argument may be made for experience velocity. As to verbatim indirect speech the quote-like quality of such consciousness representation has no distinct linguistic marker, but may select from a potentially continuous series of aspects of the speech or thought such quoted, just like the truncation of consciousness, the distortion of perspective is not primarily grammatical but rather proceeds along different continuous dimensions.

This points to the conclusion that despite the tendency of enunciation studies to fall in two halves, linguistic and literary, respectively, the unity of enunciation should be found neither in linguistics nor in literature. It should be found, rather, in the basic human need for intersubjective communication, involving the cognition of other consciousnesses the communication of aspects of those consciousnesses and the effect upon such consciousnesses.^{xvi} In that sense, the duplicity of discontinuous linguistic enunciation devices and more continuous semantic and literary enunciation devices must be reunited on a common semiotic-cognitive basis, in order to exply the surprising immediacy in our understanding of even very complicated enunciation structures in literary discourse.

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ⁱ Important exceptions to this rule can be found in French linguists such as Benveniste, Greimas, and Kerbrat-Orecchioni.

ⁱⁱ Hamburger's idea is to find precise linguistic criteria for (at least one central type of) fiction – which is why she could attack Ingarden's theory of literature, leading to the famous footnote war between the two second editions of their respective major works. Here, she attacks Ingarden's definition of fiction by means of "quasi-judgments" because such judgments are not given any independent linguistic description. Ingarden's answer was that such purely linguistic definition was impossible, because the problem was basically phenomenological. Our answer in this paper proceeds, as it will be clear, along Ingardenian lines to the extent that we also find the issue of fiction to be phenomenologically and cognitively motivated so that fiction depends on mechanisms of both grammatical and semantic-literary character.

ⁱⁱⁱ In Stanzel 1961

^{iv} It is well known how cognitive linguists such as Lakoff, Langacker and Talmy bring forth such arguments, and how it is the generative grammar that for them stands as the best (and worst) example of

the formal approach.

- ^v Sometimes, a distinction is made between "deixis", the act of linguistic referring, and "deictics", the linguistic forms used to perform such an act. Here, we indiscriminately use "deixis" to refer to both meanings.
- ^{vi} Just like the whole cognitive semantics current, the insistence on the connection between language and cognition must be counterweighed by the knowledge of the wide variety of grammatical systems across languages: such systems are motivated by – but not fully determined by – more basic cognitive structures
- ^{vii} The narratology paper's place as conclusive chapter of Talmy's chef-d'œuvre is motivated by its large part 4, presenting the most extensive version of Talmy's total system of "generic cognitive organizing principles" (446), involving such phenomenological classics as part-whole, abstraction, scope, granularity, density, continuous/discrete, vague-clear and lots of other issues of what in the Husserlian tradition would be summarized under the headline of formal ontology. We shall return to some of them below.
- ^{viii} Common to both Talmy and Chafe is thus their descriptive, taxonomic approach to consciousness types and aspects. This places their theories close to those of European phenomenology in the Husserlian tradition, even if they themselves do not refer to that tradition. This permits us, however, without basic problems, to enrich both of these approaches with references to the other.
- ^{ix} Chafe coarsely talks about "consciousness" when a more detailed account would distinguish between the consciousness as act, as quality, as content, as object, etc. of a conscious act (cf. the basic distinction presented in Husserl's 5th *Logical Investigation*.) Here, we shall continue Chafe's ambiguous use of the word in cases where the precise meaning should be evident from the context.
- ^x Thus, it is parallel to the notion of an "implied author" in Wayne C. Booth.
- ^{xi} Our own translation from Norwegian.
- ^{xii} Our translation from Danish.
- ^{xiii} In Danish discussions highlighted, for instance, in Dines Johansen 1977.
- ^{xiv} Which semiotic devices allow for specifically human cognitive abilities is an open issue – proposals are Peircean symbols (Deacon 1997), Peircean hypostatic abstractions (Stjernfelt (forthcoming)) or shared attention (Tomasello). Depending on which competences presuppose which other competences, these proposals need not necessarily be mutually exclusive.
- ^{xv} It is interesting to note that a similar idea surfaces several times in Husserl's decade-long struggle with articulating a picture theory (recorded in Husserl 1980) – see Stjernfelt (forthcoming) for a critical discussion.
- ^{xvi} Thus, Michael Tomasello's claim that "shared attention" be basic to human cognition may form a foundation for the claim that representation of consciousness is basic to language: to communicate and compare different conscious representations of the same content. Shared attention is probably closely related to the possibility of human beings to make Peircean "hypostatic abstraction" and thus make communication content the explicit object of self-criticism. See Stjernfelt (forthcoming).